

A large crowd of people, seen from an aerial perspective, has formed a large speech bubble shape on a white, flat surface. The people are densely packed along the outline of the bubble, which is oriented with its tail pointing towards the bottom left. The title of the book is printed in red serif font across the upper part of the bubble.

Thought and Reality

**A Critical Study of
Hegel's Philosophy**




18325

K. Dhirendro Ramsiej

This work on Hegel is an attempt to re-appreciate Hegel's Philosophy. Philosophy of Hegel, the great German idealistic philosopher throughout the ages has been appreciated, depreciated and also denounced. The logical positivists and even majority of philosophers belonging to analytical tradition do not seem to recognize Hegel's contribution.

Moreover, the author has very clearly explained Hegel's thesis that Reality and Thought are integrally connected. The author has tried to decipher the meaning and context of what has been said by Hegel. He has argued out in detail how Hegel was anticipated by Wittgenstein both in early and later. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as well as in *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein develops the thesis that Language, Meanings, Thought and Reality form a complex. Dr. Ramsiej has argued cogently how the ideas of Hegel is similar to those of Wittgenstein.



THIRTY-NINE YEARS

1934

THOUGHT AND REALITY

About the Author

Dr. K. Dhirendro Ramsiej was born in 1958 at Sakwang Village in West Khasi Hills, Meghalaya. He had his early education in his village and then graduated from Shillong College, Shillong, and completed his M.A. in Philosophy, M. Phil. and Ph. D. from North Eastern Hill University, Shillong. He was the founder Principal of Sngap Syiem College, Mawkyrwat, West Khasi Hills, Meghalaya, and served therefrom 1985 to 1987. He then joined as Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Shillong College, Shillong, in 1987 and continued with the academic job with distinction till he joined as the Principal of the same College on 1st July, 2011, and continues to serve in the same post till date. He was also the founder Secretary of Nongpathaw Secondary School, Nongpathaw village, Meghalaya, and also Seven Huts Secondary School, Mawlat Umthong, Shillong. He has contributed many articles and also the author of the books: "A Guide to Logic", "Ka Mariang Ha U Khasi", "Ki Khubor ka Jingim", "Khasi Philosophy of Nature" etc. He is currently a member of the following institutions: John Robert Theological Seminary, Mawklot; Synod College, Shillong; Academic Council, North Eastern Hill University; The Khasi Authors' Society; The Gideons International in India; Chairman of Cluster Resource Centre, S.S.A. Mawmih Area, and Joint Forest Management, Nongpathaw Area. He also served as the President of Meghalaya College Teachers' Association from 2005 to 2010.

THOUGHT AND REALITY

A Critical Study of Hegel's Philosophy

Dr. K. Dhirendro Ramsiej

M.A., M. Phil, Ph.D.,
Principal, Shillong College
Shillong

**CONCEPT PUBLISHING COMPANY PVT. LTD.
NEW DELHI-110059**

RAM; 7

© K. Dhirendro Ramsiej

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, micro-filming recording or otherwise, or translated in any language, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner and the publisher. The book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated, without the prior publisher's written consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published.

The views and opinions expressed in this book are author(s) own and the facts reported by him/her have been verified to the extent possible, and the publishers are not in any way liable for the same.

ISBN-13: 978-81-8069-955-9 18325

First Published 2013 193/RAM; 7

Published and Printed by 450/- 23/7/2014



Concept Publishing Company Pvt. Ltd.

A/15-16, Commercial Block, Mohan Garden

New Delhi-110059 (India)

T: 25351460, 25351794, F: 091-11-25357109

E: publishing@conceptpub.com, W: www.conceptpub.com

Editorial Office: H-13, Bali Nagar, New Delhi-110 015, India.

Cataloging in Publication Data--Courtesy: D.K. Agencies (P) Ltd. <docinfo@dkagencies.com>

Ramsiej, K. Dhirendro.


Thought and reality : a critical study of Hegel's philosophy / K. Dhirendro Ramsiej. p. cm.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--North Eastern Hill University.

Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.

ISBN 9788180699559

1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831.
2. Knowledge. Theory of.
3. Thought and thinking.
4. Reality. I. Title.



Foreword

I have a great pleasure to write a foreword for the work: *Thought and Reality: A Critical Study of Hegel*. The work was submitted to the North Eastern Hill University, Shillong for a degree and Shri K.D. Ramsiej has been awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Ramsiej has made a humble attempt to critically examine and interpret Hegel's Philosophy and has been very successful in the attempt.

It is usually believed that Hegel's Philosophy is very difficult to grasp and understand very rarely in Indian Universities. Researchers take cognizance of Hegel. In spite of the fact that Ramsiej hails from relatively inaccessible part of India yet the attempt is laudable.

Ramsiej, following the footprints of J.N. Findlay, has put Hegel in contemporary idioms. As a result heavily metaphysically laden concepts such as mind, thought, idea, thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis and last but not the least dialectic appear in clear light. Ramsiej's training in analytical philosophy and conceptual analysis has helped him a lot in this regard.

Ramsiej vehemently argues and agrees with sufficient arguments that the understanding has to be dialectical in the end. Understanding is a conceptual process and to understand

means to decipher concepts. In the process the so-called object gets conceptualized and idealized. This is what Wittgenstein advocated in *Philosophical Investigation*. Understanding without concepts and ideas is impossible. In this sense only thought and reality get so much interrelated and that it becomes almost impossible to detach them from each other. The dictum 'real is rational and rational is real' has to be understood. Further, himself being a tribal (Khasi) and a keen student of tribal culture, Ramsiej has discovered the Khasi integrated view of nature in Hegel. He has argued in detail how Hegel's view of Nature closely resembles the Khasi view of Nature prevalent in oral tradition in the Khasi land.

It is a well written work with exhaustive bibliography. The language used is very simple and straightforward. I hope it will provide an interesting reading to the researchers in the Hegelian Philosophy and general readers as well.

396/559, Paika Nagar,
Bhubaneswar
Orissa-751003

N. Malla
Retd. Professor & Dean

Acknowledgements

I am very glad to express my sincere thanks to my Supervisor, Prof. N. Malla for his valuable guidance and generous help towards the successful completion of my work. He took pains to study each and every sentence of the present work. He has spent his precious time for years with me in reading, discussing and guiding me for completing the research work in time. He has faced the odds of life in the family as well as in the University during my tenure as the Ph.D. Research Scholar but he has never discouraged me. He is always ready to help me any time when I approached him. I consider him as a great Teacher, Guide and Philosopher. He has been a source of inspiration to me. Though he lives a very simple and humble life but his knowledge and experience are as vast and deep as the ocean. I am very grateful to Prof. Malla for writing a foreward and a recommendation for publication of the book.

George Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel is a very difficult Philosopher and only few Scholars in our universities have done research on him except the comparative studies. Therefore, I really admit that without the cooperation and encouragement of the Supervisor, the work could have never been completed. I feel an indebt to him.

I am extremely grateful to Prof. Jagat Pal, the Head of the Department of Philosophy, North Eastern Hill University,

Shillong and to all the teachers of the department, who in some form or the other have helped for completion of the research work. My special thanks are due to Dr. Xavier P. Mao, Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, NEHU, who raised hopes in me, particularly at the times when I was diffident if the work could be completed at all.

I owe my special thanks and gratitude to Dr. (Mr.) M.P.R. Lyngdoh, the former Principal and the Colleagues of Shillong College, Shillong who are always encouraging me to complete the work. I am also very grateful to my mother, (late) Smt. Sabon Ramsiej, who passed away on 28.8.2007, for her support and blessings and for my wife, Smt. Istilian Myllem Marbaniang, Headmistress of Nongpathaw Secondary School for her inspiration. I will not be happy if I do not express my gratitude to my relatives, well wishers, friends and particularly my daughter, Miss Kmenlang Myllem and Miss K. Thangkhiew of Seven Huts Secondary School for their proof reading of the book. Last of all but not the least, I thank God who leads my life and who provides everything for me.

K. Dhirendro Ramsiej

Contents

<i>Foreword by Prof. N. Malla</i>	v
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
I. Introduction	1
II. Thought and Idea	19
III. Thought and Mind	47
IV. Thought and World	66
V. Logic of Dialectic	89
VI. Conclusion	109
<i>Bibliography</i>	134
<i>Index</i>	139

I

Introduction

The Primary objective of the dissertation is to make a critical assessment of the views of Hegel relating to Thought and Reality. In a general way, Hegel's Philosophy is the culmination of European philosophy beginning from that of Plato. In a specific sense, Hegelianism represents the acme point of Germanic idealism. In turn, Hegel has also influenced various trends and schools of philosophy both in the continental and British Universities. But no other philosopher has been so widely misunderstood and misinterpreted as Hegel. The so-called conceptual analysts also did not spare him. As far as we know, nobody except J.N. Findlay has tried to present a sympathetic understanding of Hegel. At the same time, it is a fact that the so-called analysts are exhibiting a wider sense of tolerance towards classical philosophers. P.F. Strawson has been a pioneer in this regard. According to Strawson, classical philosophers have to be rediscovered. Strawson's innovative concepts such as 'revisionary' and descriptive' metaphysics require us to go back to classical philosophers and rediscover them. According to Strawson, the classical philosophers have to be reinterpreted in contemporary idioms. My investigation of Hegel has mainly this end in view.

George Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart in the Duchy of Wurttemberg in the year 1770, the very year in which Kant inaugurated his professorship at Konigsberg. Hegel is commonly connected with Prussia both because he spent his later years in Berlin and because he came to give the Prussian Constitution an exaggerated philosophical indorsement. But Hegel was a Swabian, a South German and he had no fondness for anything Prussian. Hegel's ancestry could be traced back to one of the many refugee protestant families which had fled from Austria to Wurttemberg. His father was a small official in the Finance Department. He had a sister and a brother but Hegel was devoted to his sister and glorified the latter in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Their family atmosphere is greatly reflected in Hegel's philosophical writings on family. His writings contain idealized portraits of various members of the family. The family members were simple, affectionate and earnest in things both intellectual and spiritual. It is perhaps because of these reasons that Hegel regards family as the immediate ethical substance.

Hegel had his early schooling at the Stuttgart Gymnasium. Findlay maintains:

An immense capacity for silent absorption seems to have characterized him at all times and explains the almost Aristotelian range of his knowledge. It explains also the way in which Greek thought and literature, at this time mainly represented by Sophocles and the Socrates dialogues, came to permeate his mind. Of all great modern philosophers Hegel is the most thoroughly soaked and steeped in things Greek¹.

After completing studies at Gymnasium, Hegel entered the Theological Institute at Tubingen University. There he met Holderlin and Schelling who worked out a complete system of Absolute Idealism. That was the period when French

Revolution broke out. Hegel strongly reacted against the negative and abstract ideals of Revolution.

During the years from 1793 to 1800, Hegel began to develop his own ideas. He studies Kant's ethical writings. He also read both Fichte and Schelling. He was also greatly influenced by the writing of Spinoza.

Findlay writes:

Hegel developed his ideas, not so much in reaction to the opinions of philosophers, as in deep pondering on the meaning of that Christian religion which has been so inadequately presented to him at Tubingen. If Fichte approached his Absolute through morality and Schelling through his art, Hegel certainly approached his Absolute through religion².

Hegel detested positivistic interpretation of Christianity. According to Hegel, Christianity is in essence one with the moral law as found in Kant. This explains Hegel's liking for Christianity. Findlay argues:

In the Christian story of Incarnation, Passion and Resurrection of Christ, Hegel comes to see a pictorial expression of his central thesis: that what is absolute and spiritual can emerge only in painful triumph over what is seen alien and resistant³.

Gradually, Hegel was disenchanted with romantic idealism of Schelling. He did not appreciate the negative attitude of the latter towards understanding. Hegel detested certain expression such as 'intuition', 'feeling' and such like used by Schelling. In fact, Hegel reiterates that reality could be known and grasped only by what is known as the rational method.

Hegel held a chair of Philosophy at Heidelberg from 1816-1818 and at Berlin from 1818 up to his death in 1831.

Writings of Hegel

The first major work, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, was published in 1807 followed by the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Science*, published in 1816. The *Encyclopaedia* carries out the scheme, propounded in 1801, of a tripartite system containing a Logic, a Philosophy of Nature and a Philosophy of Spirit. The first part was a shortened version of the Heidelberg Science of Logic. *Philosophy of Nature* shows his astonishing knowledge of empirical science. Classroom lectures collected by Hegel's students termed as *Zusätze* in German have been added to *Philosophy of Nature* and they lend lucidity to the entire thing. Hegel also published outline of the *Philosophy of Right* in 1820, an elaboration of the second part of *Philosophy of Spirit*, containing his ethics and his theory of the State. Hegel delivered courses of lectures on Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Fine Arts and History of Philosophy. These lectures were published in the form of books after Hegel's death in 1831. It is advocated by the historians of ideas that Hegel appreciated Napoleon who fought in the battle of Jena. He characterized Napoleon as the 'world-soul' on horse back. It is said that Hegel's attitude towards Napoleon deprived him of his livelihood and consequently, he became a newspaper editor.

Findlay argues:

It is a dateless inexplicable product of genius, not led up to quite understandably by the past of philosophy or by Hegel's own past. It is as vain to seek to throw great light on it by rummaging in its temporal antecedents as it would be to try to understand the style of Wagner's Ring by making a close study of Rienzi⁴.

We are inclined to accept Findlay's comment on Hegel in this respect. The historical antecedents are not always required and helpful in understanding the philosophy of a particular philosopher. In this sense, the creation of a great philosopher is unique in nature. It is a historical in this sense. But at the same time, the fact remains that few thinkers in the history of philosophy are more controversial than Hegel. F.C. Beiser argues:

Philosophers are either for or against him. Rarely do they regard him with cool detachment weighing his merits and faults with strict impartiality. Hegel has been dismissed as a charlatan and obscurantist, but he has also been praised as one of the greatest thinkers of modern philosophy. As a result of these extreme views, Hegel has been either completely neglected or closely studied for decades⁵.

Most forms of modern philosophy have either been influenced by Hegel or reacted against him. Marxism, Existentialism, Critical theory and Hermeneutics have been influenced by Hegelianism. In a negative sense, analytical philosophy is the result of reaction against Hegelianism.

Beiser argues:

Hegel demands our attention for more than historical reasons. If we consider any fundamental philosophical problems, we find that Hegel has proposed an interesting solution for it⁶.

The Hegel's renaissance which began in 1960 still has not exonerated him from all suspicions. Russell's caustic remark that Hegel's system rests upon a few elementary logical blunders still holds sway in certain corners.

Broadly speaking, there have been two antithetical approaches to Hegel's Philosophy. One approach seeks to

explain Hegel in terms of its historical antecedents. For example, Hegel's metaphysics has been described as inverted Spinozism by some scholars. It is also characterized by some as monistic Leibnizianism. This approach can be found mainly in the older German studies of Hegel. Opposed to this historical approach is the more modern positivistic approach. It dismisses Hegel's metaphysics as a form of mysticism or speculation. But this approach values Hegel for his many ideas in epistemology, ethics, politics and aesthetics. According to this approach, we can find much of philosophical significance in Hegel but it has nothing to do with his metaphysics which is only the mystical shell. This approach to Hegel can be found in the Marxist tradition, in the Frankfurt School, and in those recent studies that regard Hegel's Philosophy simply as a form of categorial analysis.

But both these approaches suffer from difficulties. The historical approach lacks a philosophical perspective and the positivistic approach has an anachronistic conception of Hegel's philosophical significance. Further, both the approaches fail to see that Hegel himself regarded metaphysics as a very problematic undertaking. Hegel like Kant insisted that any future metaphysics must be based upon a critique of thought and knowledge.

Any introduction to Hegel's Philosophy should answer *four* basic questions:

- (1) What does Hegel mean by "metaphysics"?,
- (2) What does he mean by the "absolute"?, (3) Why does he postulate the existence of the absolute? and
- (4) How does he justify the attempt to know it in the face of Kant's critique of knowledge? Before we examine Hegel's defense of metaphysics, we must give

an account of what he means by “metaphysics”. The term “metaphysics” is usually vague and ambiguous. It can refer to several kinds of disciplines: to an ontology, a study of being, to a cosmology, a study of the first principles and even to theology, a study of the highest being. Hegel used “metaphysics” as rational knowledge of the absolute. This is one of the classical senses of the term “metaphysics”. This is the sense given to it by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Metaphysics is an attempt to know the unconditioned through pure reason. Thus, metaphysics is the knowledge of the absolute. Hegel borrowed this concept from F.W.J. O'Schelling. Both Schelling and Hegel accepted Spinoza's concept and definition of substance as *causa sui*, the uncaused cause of everything. In other words, the Spinozistic substance turned into absolute in the hands of Schelling and Hegel. The Spinozistic substance is the Hegelian absolute. The absolute is all inclusive and is identical with the universe as a whole. In other words, since nothing falls outside the ken of the universe so nothing also falls outside the absolute. The absolute is not the cause of the universe but the universe itself. F.C. Beiser rightly points out:

Schelling and Hegel also insist that their metaphysics has nothing to do with the supernatural. Their conception of metaphysics is indeed profoundly naturalistic. They banish all occult forces and the supernatural from the universe explaining everything in terms of natural laws. They admired Spinoza precisely because of his thorough going naturalism, precisely because he made a religion out of nature itself,

conceiving of God as nothing more than the natural naturans⁷.

Though both Schelling and Hegel accepted the Spinozistic substance, yet they rejected the mechanistic conception associated with it. Spinoza used to explain everything in mechanistic terms. But Schelling and Hegel replaced mechanism by vitalism, organicism. They conceived of the single infinite substance in vitalistic and teleological terms. Schelling saw substance as a living force; the force of all forces.

Beiser argues:

According to Schelling, all of nature is a hierarchic manifestation of this force, beginning with its lower degree of organization and development in minerals, plants, and animals, and ending with its highest degree of organization and development in human self-consciousness. The absolute is not simply a machine, then but an organism, a self-generating and self-organizing whole⁸.

Spinoza's mechanistic philosophy, was in a way the result of the mechanistic science of his day. But the vitalistic view of philosophy of both Schelling and Hegel was the result of the vitalistic science of their time. According to Schelling, mind and body are not distinct kinds of entities, but simply different degree of organization and development of living force. Mind is the most organized and matter is not so much organized.

Both Schelling and Hegel believed that their metaphysics was exempted from Kant's critique of speculative metaphysics. The victims of Kant's criticism was the Leibnizian Wolffian school of metaphysics which conceived of the absolute as a supernatural entity existing beyond the sphere of nature. Schelling and Hegel would agree with this criticism of Kant. But they would not accept the Kantian *Noumenon* which is

unknown and unknowable. If metaphysics is conceived in naturalistic terms then we do not need a *Noumenon* at all. Both Schelling and Kant rejected the rigid distinction between the apriori and the aposteriori. They insisted on banishing all occult force from nature and explaining everything according to natural laws. The only thing is that they conceived the laws of nature not in mechanical terms but in teleological terms. Beiser argues.

Schelling's and Hegel's metaphysics should be placed within the tradition of vitalistic materialism, which goes back to Bruno and the early free-thinkers of seventeenth century England. This tradition attempts to banish the realm of the supernatural, yet it was not atheistic. Rather, it conceived of God as the whole of nature⁹.

The difference between Kant on the one hand, and Schelling and Hegel on the other, is this: For Kant, we cannot confirm the idea of a natural purpose through experience and we attribute purpose to nature only by analogy. The idea of a purpose has only a heuristic value. The idea of an organism is not "constitutive" but only "regulative" for Kant. Kant denies but Hegel affirms that nature is an organism.

Further, both Schelling and Hegel were very much dissatisfied with the disastrous dualism of Kant that is between sensibility and understanding. According to them, if we conceive nature as an organism and the knowing subject as only part of it, we can explain the interaction between subject and object. Like Kant, both Schelling and Hegel argued that we cannot have any knowledge beyond the limits of experience. Schelling developed an elaborate epistemology to justify knowledge of the absolute. Accordingly, he recognizes the role of intellectual intuition for the purpose. Schelling did not wish to revive the old demonstrative methods of

Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism. Following Kant, he argues that we cannot have knowledge of the unconditioned through reason. He agrees with Kant that the discursive powers of judgement cannot know the unconditioned and any attempt to know it will just end up in antinomies, amphibolies, and paralogism. But at the same time, Schelling maintains that it is through intellectual intuition that we know the absolute. It is different both from empirical intuitions of sensibility and discursive power of understanding. Though Hegel, in his early years was a champion of intellectual intuition, gradually he gave it up and argued in favour of what is otherwise known as the dialectical method. Hegel's dialectic is a kind of experience of consciousness. Hegel shows how any attempt in ordinary consciousness leads to contradiction and conflict and this contradiction is resolved through rising to a more inclusive standpoint. The dialectic continues until a standard of knowledge is found that is adequate to the experience of consciousness. This is the point where subject-object identity takes place.

Beiser argues:

What Hegel attempts to provide in this work is nothing less than "a transcendental deduction" of absolute knowledge. Just as Kant attempted to provide a transcendental deduction of concepts of the understanding by showing them to be necessary conditions of possible experience, so Hegel attempts to do the same for absolute knowledge¹⁰.

There are several reasons why a general restatement and reassessment of Hegel should be attempted. Hegel's influence both in the past and the present century has been so very vast

that it deserves the attention of scholars. Hegel's philosophy has excited both admiration and denigration. As a result, it has given birth to many movements and counter movements ever since it was promulgated. His native Germany deified him during his life time. After his death the so-called 'right wing' and 'left wing' Hegelianism began to develop. Those who interpreted Hegelianism as supporting a philosophical orthodoxy were known as right wing Hegelians and those who interpreted it as opposing the orthodoxy were known as the left wing Hegelians. During the positivistic period of Bismarkian age, they tended to forget Hegel. This has been his fate. The Anglo-Saxon world also felt the impact of Hegel. Royce in America and Bradley and T.H. Green in England were too influenced by Hegelianism. It is also true that analytical philosophy in the present century developed in reaction against Hegelianism. Peter Hylton argues:

It is often thought that analytic philosophy arose at least in part, from a reaction against Hegel, or against philosophy inspired by Hegel. To some extent this is correct. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore in the first decade or so of this century, which was enormously influential for subsequent analytic philosophy, was developed in conscious reaction to idealist views that owned much to Hegel¹¹.

Italy also produced great Hegelians like Croce and Gentile. Hegel had also its influence in India and the Far East. But it is Karl Marx who transformed Hegel in an extraordinary manner. Existentialism arose as a sharp reaction against the Hegelian concept of history and man. Robert C. Solomon argues:

Against the enthusiastic individualism of the existentialist, there is always Hegel to remind us of the profound

unimportance of the individual; against the existentialist's overly anxious focus on the present and the near future there is the Hegelian perspective of history as a whole, in which the present cannot even be understood except as a historical product¹².

Findlay argues:

It is not however, an account of his mere influence that Hegel deserves a restatement and reassessment. He deserves it on account of the originality and permanent interest of his ideas, and an account of the extent to which these ideas have been overlaid by prejudiced misconceptions, due largely to the extreme difficulty and wanton obscurity of the language in which they were stated¹³.

Hegel has been misunderstood throughout the ages. He has been termed as a transcendent metaphysician and a subjectivist, a maniac rationalist and a thorough going political reactionary, responsible ancestrally for the atrocities of Hitlerism. I agree with J.N. Findlay that these charges against Hegel are unwarranted and uncalled for. A transcendent metaphysician is one who holds that there are things beyond the possible ken of experience. As a matter of fact, both in *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Science* Hegel lays emphasis on what is immediate and given in experience. Though Hegel uses the expressions such as "Absolute", "Being", "Becoming" and etc. he does not use them as referring to some suprasensible object to what is given in experience.

Findlay commenting on Hegel writes:

Considering these works, there can be no doubt at all that Hegel sees what is 'absolute' in nothing which

lies beyond the experiences and activities of men: The Absolute, he says is 'what is entirely present', what is 'on hand and actual', not something over and above things or 'behind them'. The Hegelian Absolute is not realized in a supramundane consciousness, nor in a timeless comprehensive vision, but in the creative activities and products of the artist, the faith and worship of the religious person, and the systematic insights of the philosopher. One might say, in fact, that there never has been a philosopher by whom, the fenseibige, the merely transcendent, has been more thoroughly 'done away with', more thoroughly shown to exist only as revealed in human experience¹⁴.

But at the same time it is a fact that Hegel uses certain expressions such as 'Idea', 'God' and etc. which smack of transcendentalism and other worldliness. But I wish to point out that these words do not stand for or refer to some suprasensible entities; rather, these expressions have been used as 'conceptual blue-prints' (to use Findlay's diction) of the world of experience in space and time. If at all anybody is an absolutist or transcendent idealist it is F.H. Bradley and McTaggart and not Hegel. In fact, it is not Hegel but some Hegelians who may be termed as transcendent idealist. It is Bradley who talked of Absolute Experience and McTaggart who made the Absolute into a timeless fellowship of spirits. They also made imperfect use of Hegel's dialectic. Findlay rightly points out:

Hegel, however, is not to be numbered among them, and must be praised or condemned for his own doctrines, and not those of others¹⁵.

The charge of subjectivism is also not acceptable. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature clearly proves that his philosophy cannot be termed as a variety of subjective idealism of Berkeley or that of Kant. *Esse est percipi* will not be acceptable to Hegel. Further, the Kantian argument that mind maketh nature is not also acceptable to Hegel. Further, the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and noumenon is not also acceptable to Hegel. Findlay maintains that Hegel's idealism is Hellenic rather than Kantian. The Hegelian 'Idea' is objective after the manner of Plato and Aristotle and not after the manner of Kant. Hegel argues that the natural world existed much before life and consciousness came into existence. Findlay argues:

It is clear that Hegel thought that conscious spiritual beings were the last beings to arrive on the scene of the world, and that 'Absolute Spirit' as manifest in the highest forms of art, religion and philosophy was the last stage to be reacted in their experience¹⁶.

The Hegelian idealism can be characterized as a variety of teleological idealism in the manner of Aristotle. Like Aristotle, Hegel argues that the world has a *telos* or purpose. It is the final cause that plays the most important role. Nothing is meaningful in the world unless it serves the purpose of the self-conscious spirit. Further, the view that Hegel was standing on his head and Marx made him stand on his legs is also not acceptable. There is as much materialism in Hegel as there is idealism in Marx. Hegel never failed to take cognizance of the material world. Similarly, there is also a strong strain of teleological idealism in the supposedly scientific materialism of Marx.

Hegel has also been charged of apriorism. That is to say that scholars have argued that Hegel has deduced everything from certain apriori principles on the model of mathematical

deduction. But this charge is not acceptable. Hegel certainly believed in a kind of Systematic Science (*Wissenschaft*) in which all concepts even those applied in history, science, mathematics, religion and etc. could be put together in a coherent fashion, Findlay argues:

The rules of this 'Systematic science' are, however, far from being deductive in the sense in which the rules of syllogism or mathematical calculus are deductive¹⁷.

In other words, concepts are not necessarily connected; they are loosely connected. Hegel persistently espouses Kepler and Goethe against Newton. Thus, it may appear that he is either siding with one type of scientific theory against another or interested in truth or falsity of certain scientific theory. His aim is not to do science or history of science but to frame concepts and categories in terms of which the scientific results could be philosophically grasped. Findlay argues;

That such a reconceiving of historical and scientific fact can be valuable and illuminating, as that it can also be arbitrary and absurd¹⁸.

It is sometimes thought that Hegel is full of contradiction. That is to say that Hegel makes self-contradictory statement. But close reflection would show that there is no such contradiction in Hegel. Hegel was trying to show the latent tendencies contained in ordinary expressions. As a result, this leads to certain apparent contradictions. When we draw our attention to religious discourse, we realize the importance of apparently contradictory language. Expressions such as "He is" and "He is not" very often used in religious discourse reflects it. Therefore, it is not that Hegel has made self-contradictory statement, but as a matter of fact, while trying to state hidden aspects of language and discourse, Hegel has made certain apparently contradictory statements.

Some scholars have held Hegel responsible for rise of Hitler's Fascism and other reactionary movements. In fact, he is said to be a forebearer of both Prussianism and Fascism. But it may be said in this connection that Hegel explicitly maintained a very balanced political opinion. He advocated great respect for persons, overriding all racial, and ethnic considerations which was a direct negation of what Hitler stood for.

A great philosopher is one who has relevance for every age and whose philosophy lends itself to myriad forms of interpretations. The German Romantic interpreted Hegel in a particular manner and the Victorians and the Edwardians interpreted it in another manner. Has Hegel's Philosophy any relevance for what is known as contemporary philosophy? To this question our answer is yes. Let us reflect on it. Findlay seeks to discover conceptual affinity between Hegel and Wittgenstein. I am greatly inclined to agree with the views of Findlay. Like Wittgenstein, Hegel also recognizes the 'open texture' nature of language. In fact, both of them recognize the unclear corners of all living notions. Findlay argues:

Our ideas of time, of matter, of infinity, of knowledge, of being and so forth, are all poised as it were, in unstable equilibrium, and the slightest push given by unusual examples will suffice to set them rolling. That our ideas and verbal usages are 'dialectical' in this manner is certainly something of which contemporary thought is aware even if it tends rather to arrest than to promote this 'rolling' of our notions¹⁹.

According to later Wittgenstein, a certain kind of misunderstanding of language gives rise to philosophical puzzles. Sometimes, we tend to exaggerate and absolutise certain tendencies of expression; as a result, certain kind of metaphysics emerges. Ordinary language is fluid and

amorphous. Consequently, we are likely to misunderstand it. Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* says:

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language²⁰.

It is language which sometimes bewitches our thought and we must fight a battle to protect against this bewitchment of intellect. In this respect, Hegel comes very close to Wittgenstein. The bewitchment of intellect according to Hegel, is caused not through misunderstanding but through 'Understanding' the faculty of 'hard-and-fast' abstract thought which is opposed to 'Reason'. It is 'Understanding';—which causes rigidity both in thought and language and this rigidity can only be loosened by Reason alone. According to Wittgenstein, when such rigidities and exaggerations disappear, the ordinary nature of language shines forth. On the other hand, according to Hegel, the emergence of such confusion and rigidity is very essential for final result. Further, these rigidities and exaggerations are not at all eliminated but retained and preserved in language.

Again, Hegel, like some contemporary philosophers also recognizes the unity between thought and language. According to him, thought is a kind of interiorization of language and symbols are a kind of externalization of thought. All these show that Hegel simply cannot be dismissed as antiquated and irrelevant.

The dissertation consists of six chapters. The first chapter is entitled *Introduction*. The second chapter is entitled *Thought and Idea*. The third chapter is entitled *Thought and Mind*. The fourth chapter is entitled *Thought and the World*. The fifth chapter is entitled *Logic of Dialectic* and the sixth chapter is entitled *Conclusion*.

References

1. Findlay, J.N. *Hegel: A Re-examination* New York: Humanities Press, 1958, p. 28
2. *Ibid.*, p. 30
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, p. 33
5. Beiser, F.C. *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, p. 1.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 1
7. *Ibid.*, p. 5
8. *Ibid.*, p. 6
9. *Ibid.*, p. 9
10. *Ibid.*, p. 20
11. *Ibid.*, p. 445
12. Solomon, Robert *From Hegel to Existentialism*, OUP, 1987, p. ix.
13. Findlay, J.N. *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, p. 18
14. *Ibid.*, p. 20
15. *Ibid.*, p. 21
16. *Ibid.*, p. 22
17. *Ibid.*, p. 23
18. *Ibid.*, p. 24
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27
20. Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. By G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976, Sect. 109.

II

Thought and Idea

In this chapter, I wish to deal with questions such as: What is thought? What are ideas? Is thought a mental process? Are ideas mental contents or copies of objects? What has Hegel to say in this regard? These types of questions are not only significant in Hegelean Philosophy but also in the entire history of philosophy.

Thought is a very important notion in history of philosophy. It is the central notion in Hegel's Logic. Even when we ask the meaning of thought we are already involved in the operation of thought. According to Hegel, the movement of Dialectic has forced thought to become self-conscious and whatever it deals with an expression of thought. It is a continuous process and it is like a conscious piece of object.

According to Hegel, the unity of consciousness constitutes the relation of thought to objects and that is why, there is objective validity. The self so conceived, is simply objects revealing themselves as they truly are instances of a kind of terms in a relational unity, and so forth; it is not a special content set over against other contents and counting as 'subjective' while they count as 'objective'. The object is in thought, so it is for the first time in and for itself. The question

here may arise: What do we mean by objective? And what do we mean by subjective? When we say something as 'objective' we mean that something is independent of us; it is external and outside us. But when we say something is 'subjective' we mean that it is within us; it is internal and psychic.

The main distinction between man and animal is the presence of thought in man while the animal lacks it. Rationality makes a man nobler. If man loses the power of thinking and reasoning, he will be the same as an animal. Hence, thought is very effective and necessary to human life.

Hegel is of the view that thought is the essential, fundamental and effective process of man mainly concerned with an infinite multiplicity and variety of objects. Thought is very effective in the sense that it produces itself by its very own activity. It cannot be said to be there as an unrelated object; it exists only by its own self-production. What it produces in this way is Philosophy. Therefore, the history of philosophy is the history of thought. Thought is very essential to human life.

Hegel argues:

The history of philosophy displays thinking, and thinking is essentially one; its developments are only different shapings of one and the same thing. Thought is the universal substance of the spirit; from it everything else is developed. In everything human it is thinking, thought, which is the effective thing. An animal lives too, it shares needs, feelings, etc. with man. But if man is to be distinguished from animal, his feelings must be human, not animal, i.e. thought must be implicit in it. An animal has sensuous feelings, desires etc., but no religion, science, art, or imagination. In all these, thinking is at work¹.

Thought does not work only as thinking but as will, vision, memory, feeling, etc. in human system, and when we look more closely we will realize that thinking is not something particular or specific force, but the essence of everything. Thought is universal; it is not a sensuous universal such as chair, horse, white, etc. Thought is prior to the world and its creation. Space and time are prior to experience and it does not mean that we are aware of space and time before we have any experience. So also thought is prior to sense-perceptions, not in time but in logical order. Hence, in Hegel, priority of thought is a logical priority.

According to Hegel, state, religion, sciences, arts, etc. are the productions and effects of thought. Therefore, history of philosophy is the history of substantive and universal element in thinking. In this, history and meaning coincide with the external presentation of thought. There is neither an external nor an internal thought, for thinking for itself is the inner thing. In other sciences, form and content fall apart but in philosophy, thought is itself and is self-determining. Thought is active and a living process; it has various kinds of relations with itself and is self-differentiating. Thought is not stagnant but moving itself onwards.

Hegel is of the view that thought is free and pure, but usually it is presented in one way or the other. It is more specific and particular. Thus, thought has two distinct features. Firstly, the way it appears in the specific productions of human spirit, for instance, in art. Philosophy is free, unrestricted and pure thinking. It is at home with itself. Secondly, the objects are given to us through the senses. The earth, the sun, etc. are there confronting us. We know them and believe in them on the authority of our senses. Insofar as the object is given, thought is not free; the object is not

the self, so that I am not at home with myself, that is, I am not free.

Philosophy is a subject which teaches us to think, to observe and to conduct ourselves in all kinds of thinking. It deals with the objects of a special kind, because its object is the essence of things not the thing undeveloped, and appearances. Philosophy does not deal with the idea in empirical sense but with the essence of the object, and this essence is thought itself.

Furthermore, Hegel describes that the essence is nothing other than thought itself. The essence is the universal and the eternal which is unchangeable. God is pictured in different forms, but His essence is the universal and the immutable which pervades all the pictures. The essence of nature, that is, the mechanical laws are particular whereas the essence of objects, i.e. thought is universal.

According to Hegel², universal is the essence of thinking and in pure thinking we deal with universality alone. Of course, there is the universal in desire and the like but it is mixed up with much that is particular and sensuous attribute. To be an object of thought means to be derived from the universal, and thereupon, we have the product of thinking, namely a thought. It is admitted that if we want to know the essence of God, we must have to reflect. The product of reflection is then a thought. When we use the word 'thought' we imagine something subjective: we say, we think according to something; we have thought about a thing, so thought is not the thing itself but the latter is solidified thought. Thought is unchangeable. Thus, philosophy deals with the universal. Philosophical thinking is absolutely free; it is not dependent on something else. Thinkers too are free because they are at home with themselves. Philosophers have the

universal for the object and free from mutability of the subjects.

Therefore, a true thought is in itself and for itself. It is eternal, universal and unchangeable. There is no alteration in thought; it is the same both in the past, present and future. Like Plato, Hegel is of the view that opinion are not thought; for opinions are of one's own self and are derivative whereas thought are universals.

Philosophy deals with thought. Thinking is the innermost part of everything. Philosophy is the second order study or discourse. Philosophical thinking is the thinking of the universal. The product of thinking is thought, and this may be objective or subjective. Objectively regarded, thoughts are called universals, but we know that such a universal is something abstract, different from the particular. Therefore, in that case, the universal is the form, and the particular is the content.

Thought is not something empty and abstract but it is determining, self-determining indeed. In other words, thought is essentially concrete in nature. This concrete thought is what we call the concept. Thought must be a concept, no matter how abstract it may seem; it must be concrete in itself. In other words, as soon as thought is philosophical, it is concrete in itself. In one way, it is correct enough to say that philosophy keeps busy itself with abstraction just because it has to do with thought abstracted from the so-called concrete world of sense perceptions. But, in another way, it is wholly false. Abstractions are proper to the reflection of the understanding, not to philosophy. It is precisely those who accused philosophy of abstraction that are sunk most deeply in the categories of reflection while they are supposed to be immersed in the most concrete sort of material. So, by reflecting on a thing they

have thought which are purely subjective sense perception, that is, abstractions.

The questions may arise: What is an abstract thought? What is a concrete thought? Is there any possibility to combine these two types of thought? Prior to Hegel, abstract thought was treated as the product of mind which has no link with the empirical world. It is the form of cognition which mentally isolates properties of an object or connections between its properties from others. Thinking of the essence and objectivity is the abstract thought.

The concrete thought on the other hand, is understood mainly as the sensuous object and the phenomenon. It is conceived as material and objective. It is considered as the whole, many sided, complex, developed and etc. Concrete thought is factual thought on the specific object and conditions. It denotes the solidarity of real or definite objects.

Hegel was the first philosopher who made use of the categories of the abstract and the concrete in specific philosophical meaning. The abstraction is not metaphysically opposed to the concreteness but it is a stage in the development of the concrete itself; it is the unrevealed, undeveloped and concrete. Hegel compares the relation between the abstract and the concrete to that between the bud and the fruit, the acorn and the oak tree. It contains no difference. It is also compared to that of Being and Nothing. The quality of the thing, e.g. chairness, is an abstraction while chair itself is the concrete. Brownness, hardness, etc. apart from brown and hard thing are abstractions. For Hegel, Being and Nothing are included in the category of Becoming. It is like the Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis. This Thesis and Antithesis, taken apart, will be one-sided abstractions as against their concrete

unity, the 'synthesis. According to Hegel, the concrete characterises only the spirit, the thought and the Absolute Idea. Nature and social relations of people are revelations of individual aspects or moment in the life of the Absolute Spirit. Hence, there is every possibility to combine both the abstract and the concrete in Hegelian philosophy.

Thought appears both in thinking process and in the history itself. Apart from the fact that we think something and that there are thoughts, there are also sense perceptions, instincts, inclinations, act of will etc. Thought exist as a particular along with other particulars. Thinking is the activity of the universal and this activity is something particular insofar as there are other activities along its way. But its true nature is that it subsumes all others under itself. Man is distinguished from animal by virtue of his thought. Feelings, instincts, etc. are common to both man and beast, but particular feeling e.g., religious, moral and etc. belong only to man alone.

Thinking does belong to man alone but not merely to man as single individual. Thought is the universal. In nature we find thoughts present according to its species and laws, and thus, they are not merely present in the form of consciousness but absolutely and therefore objectively. Knowledge of the nature of thought removes the subjective mode of its appearance and this proves that thought is not something particular, subjective belonging to our consciousness only but is universal and objective absolutely.

Thought appears in time. Determinate thought emerges at a particular period in a particular neighbourhood and in particular individual so that their emergence looks like accidental sequence. We have already explained how this

appearance is ratified. We do take up thought historically just as they have appeared in this or that individual but this development in time proceeds in accordance with the inner necessity of the concepts.

Before we examine the meaning and relationship between thought and ideas, it is necessary to understand the meaning of 'concept' in Hegel's philosophy.

What is the concept? A concept is one of the oldest terms used in philosophical study and discourse. It is very difficult to give one straight answer to the question 'what is a concept?' Philosophers and logicians have tried in their own ways to answer the above question. In common parlance, concept means general idea, thought or image. Concept is a form of reflection of the world at the stage of cognition associated with the use of language. A concept is a word which has a meaning. Concept denotes thought which generalizes objects of certain class according to their specific attributes. It is possible to say that we have a concept of 'x' when we have (a) to know the meaning of the word 'x'; (b) to be able to pick out or recognize a presented 'x' or to be able to think of 'x'; (c) to know the nature of 'x', to have grasped or apprehended the properties or characteristics of 'x'. But these descriptions of the concept are not satisfactory at all. When we talk of a concept we involve ourselves in defining, interpreting or describing and thinking of knowledge. To have a concept is to know the meaning of a particular term.

Again, when we have a concept of 'x' we can apply the word 'x' correctly. We have a concept of redness and orange-ness when we can correctly apply the words 'red' and 'orange' in all cases. For example, I have a particular concept of what a rose is, for I always use the term 'rose' in the right situation. I never apply the term 'rose' to lily or other flowers. But to

say that we have a concept does not mean that we are able to use the corresponding word always.

It can be argued that to have a concept of 'x'; implies that we are able to distinguish 'x' from 'y' or 'z' and from other thing which are not 'x'. This definition of a concept is not generally accepted because there is a possibility to say that a child who can distinguish between A and B cannot be said to have a concept. A school boy is able to make a distinction between '2' and '3' but he may not have the concepts associated with these numbers. To escape from this criticism we may say that to have a concept of 'x' is simply to have some criterion in mind. It would consist of some kind of mental object which is quite independent of words and quite independent of distinguishing xs from ys and zs. But there is a possibility to have a concept of 'x' even though there is no 'x' in this empirical world at all. I may have a concept of a palace in the sky, more beautiful than other palaces on the earth and there may not be any such palace in reality at all. I may have a concept of a problem free nation but it may not be there in reality.

Concepts, for Hegel, are necessary for any language. Every word, except proper names, stands for a concept. It is impossible to think or to have knowledge without a concept; W.T. Stace in his book, *The Philosophy of Hegel* maintains:

For there are not only concepts of substantive things, but also concepts of qualities, actions, relations. "To give" is a concept, for it describes a whole class of actions. "This" is a concept, since it applies, not only to one individual thing, but all things. Everything is a "this". "Is" is a concept, since all things "are". "In" is a concept, for it expresses an entire class of relations. There are no words in any language which do not stand for concepts. Thus, not merely some knowledge,

but all knowledge, is conceptual. Hence, from bare sensation, as such, no knowledge can arise. Concepts are not perceived by the senses, but are the work of the mind which compares, contrasts, and classifies what the senses give it³.

Every word stands for a concept. But a concept is not a particular thing; it is a general class, it is a universal. Idealists would say that universals alone are real.

A concept is different from bare thought. A concept is a thought determining itself in its vivacity and activity. A concept is a thought that tends to be active, able to determine itself, to create and generate itself. Concepts are concrete in nature, self-determining and self-particularizing. Hence, for Hegel, concept is both subjective and objective manifestation. It is not only universal but is concrete thought.

Now, let us examine the term 'Idea' and its relationship to thought as we find in Hegel's philosophy. Questions may arise: What is an Idea? How is it related to thought? Are ideas mental contents or copies of objects? Hegel writes:

Concrete thought, expressed more precisely, is the concept, and still further determined, is the Idea. The Idea is the concept's self-realization. To realize itself must be self-determining and its determinate character is nothing but itself. Thus, its content is itself. Its infinite relation to itself is that it determines itself entirely out of its own resources.

The idea or reason is also concept, but, just as thought determines itself as concept, so reason determines itself as subjective thought. When we say of a concept that it determines itself, it is still abstract. The Idea is the concept filled, filled by and with itself. Reason, or the Idea is free, rich, concrete in itself; it is the concept

which makes itself concrete, bestow its reality on itself. I can say, 'the concept of something', but not 'the idea of something', because this has its content in itself. Idea is actuality in its truth. Reason is the concept giving itself reality, i.e., reason consists of Concept and Reality. The Soul is the Concept, it gives itself actuality in the body, i.e. in reality. If concept and reality fall apart, the man is dead. This unification is not to be regarded as mere unity in general, because reason is essentially vitality and activity; its essential activity consists in the fact that the Concept produced itself, makes itself its own content, but in such a way that what is produced is always in conformity with the Concept. Reality is always dependent on the Idea, never independent. It seems to be another concept, another content, but this is not so. If there is a difference between an Object and the Concept, this difference lies only in the form of externality. Reality is established as identical with the Concept⁴.

Idea is another philosophical term denoting sense, meaning, perception and which is closely connected with the categories of thinking and being. When Idea is regarded as one that exists in the mind only it denotes a sensory image that arises in the mind as a reflection of sensory objects. It also denotes the sense or essence of things reducible to sensation and impressions of the subject. Many philosophers have tried to define and explain this term at different periods, i.e. ancient, medieval and modern times. Plato used the term idea in his philosophy to mean a universal and not a particular. According to him, Idea or Form, is apprehended by the intellect which does not exist in time and cannot come into existence

or cease to exist as temporal things do. Idea is more real than things. Things are copies of Ideas. There is an Idea of beauty, so beautiful things exist in the world.

In medieval philosophy, the dominant view was that Ideas or Forms are patterns in accordance with which God conceived and created other things. Descartes in the modern period regarded some ideas as thoughts innate to man. According to Descartes, Ideas are effective, that is, they are capable of being put to use in developing knowledge and they have the characteristics of clearness and distinctness. Thoughts (or what we may call ideas ordinarily) may be divided into ideas proper and judgement. The former are simply images that appear in our mind without being judged upon. Judgements are decisions as to the significance of Ideas proper. Ideas proper cannot be right or wrong, We simply have them. Judgements, on the other hand, may be right or wrong. We judge that 'Blood is red'; it is either right or wrong. It cannot be both. Ideas may be adventitious in nature. They may come to us by chance or may be forced upon us by the vagaries of sense experience. Yet some of the ideas may be clear and distinct.

Idea as Image and Meaning

The term 'idea' goes back in its origin to Greek literature. Idea is universal in contrast to the particular. According to Plato, Idea or form is apprehended by the intellect, does not exist in time, and cannot come into existence or cease to exist as temporal things do. Hence, Idea is more real than things are; things cannot come into existence without idea. As for instance, the idea of beauty is prior to beautiful things in the world.

According to the medieval philosophers, idea or form is

regarded as the pattern in accordance with which God conceived things and created them, hence, they are thought of as existing in the mind of God. Descartes is of the view that idea is thought existing in the minds of men. He also used the word 'idea' in the sense of shape or form stamped upon a soft material. These ideas are formed in the mind by external objects acting upon it.

Those who maintain that ideas are mental image, argue that they (ideas) are produced in the mind by the operation of external objects. Locke treats ideas as perceptions of sensible qualities. Hume is of the view that thinking operates with mental images. Further, he considers idea and images to be the same. Hume in *Treatise of Human Nature* states that impressions are created in the mind, which remain after they (impressions) cease to be there and this we call an idea. Many other philosophers too, consider ideas as mental images or pictures of the external object.

Any judgement or reasoning relating to idea is necessarily involved with two collateral conditions, viz., image and meaning. Therefore, let us explain the significance and conjunction of idea in a judgement in relation to image and meaning. Both Bradley and Bosanquet are of the view that idea or ideas which are involved in a judgement may have two principal characteristics: the one is a psychical presentation and the other is meaning. A psychical presentation in a judgement involves the particular mental process, it does not relate to things or meanings. Such judgement is partial or untrue because it is always the result of the present moment or memory; it does not repeat the past. Such ideas cannot refer to anything beyond our particular mental life. An idea involves not the particular psychic presentation or an image but meaning proper.

Bosanquet makes a distinction between an image and meaning as follows:

No two people, who have seen it (St. Paul's Cathedral in London) have carried away precisely the same image of it in their minds, nor does memory, when it represents the Cathedral to each of them, supply the same image in every detail and association twice over to the same person, nor do we for a moment think that such an image is the Cathedral. Yet we neither doubt that the same means something, and that the same to all those who employ it, nor that it means the same to each of them at one time that it did or every other time. The psychical images which formed the first vision of it are dead and gone forever, and so, after every occasion on which it has been remembered, are those in which that memory was evoked. The essence of the idea does not lie in the peculiarities of any one of their varying presentations, but in the identical reference that runs through them all, and to which they all serve as material, and the content of this reference is the object of our thought⁵.

From the above quotation, the distinction between image and meaning in relation to an idea is very clear. An image has a particular reference depending upon our attention to and interest in a particular object determined by its memory while meaning is constituted by the unvarying and essential elements of an object which gives a constant character to it.

Mental images stand not only as the provisional appearance but also to serve as the bearer of meaning of our language. Berkeley argued that images must be particular. He

claimed that it is impossible for anyone to form a general idea or image of a triangle, for it would have to be either oblique or rectangular, or equilateral, equiangular, or scalene but not all and one at once. Berkeley is of the view that in some cases, thought may proceed without image, because there may not be image or mental picture to correspond with some terms of our vocabulary. The Wurzburg School of Psychologists⁶ maintain that their experiments prove the existence of imageless thought. Thought may exist without any image. Wittgenstein⁷ in 20th century rejects the image-theory of thought. According to him, meaning of an expression is not necessarily connected with the image and picture that it evokes in mind.

Price⁸ argues that both words and images are used as symbols. Images symbolise by resemblance. He argues that images like other pictures are related to their objects by resemblance. Such a view assumes that there is no problem in recognising a picture of, say, a man as a man just as anyone who could pick out a real man, could also identify a mirror image of a man. A man who carries a photograph of his sweetheart does it to remind himself of her, uses it as a kind of substitute for her presence. Real pictures are distinct from mental pictures in their uses.

Some thinkers maintain that images are not pictures. A picture may be used to give information; from a picture of the pantheon, it is possible to discover the number of columns in the facade. But an image of the pantheon may not be sufficiently detailed to enable us to do this. If one does not know the number, then one cannot count the columns in one's image. In this way, images differ radically from pictures. In image, there is no clue to recognize its identity whereas, in

picture there is a possibility of the clue to its identity. Thus, having an image differs from contemplating either the object or picture of it. The image is not a picture in a special private gallery. We can talk of picturing or visualizing but we cannot talk about such images which represent the physical objects.

It can be pointed out in this connection, that images are not always under our control; a person may feel that he is haunted by the image of a street accident or by the cries of the victims. Mental images have no location and are not related to public visual space; it is meaningless to ask a person, as some psychologists have done, to project his mental image onto a screen, for it is impossible to look at the physical world and contemplate an image at the same time. Sartre used the term 'quasiobservation for seeing a visual image or hearing an auditory one.

A picture may be regarded as a pattern of pigment on a piece of canvas on account of its function as a picture which we may use to recall as for example, the face of an absent friend. So also a mental image is used to identify an object that is of our interest, nor the image itself. Hamlyn argue:

When we are thinking, although we must know what our images are of, it is not necessary for us to know what our images are like even whether they are clear and distinct or fuzzy and shifting⁹.

It is very difficult to know what they are like, for they are described only in terms of objects they represent. In the case of the portrait, there is a public object that can be described in physical terms and can serve as the analogue of the absent friend. When we regard images as the prior requisite of our thought we treat them as pictures.

Ideational theory of meaning is advocated by the empiricists. According to this theory, any meaningful word is related to sensible marks of idea. Ideas play very significant role in knowledge situation. Language is an act of communication of thought and thought consists of succession of ideas in consciousness. These ideas are directly accessible only to the possessor. So, any meaningful word is always associated with idea. The ideational theory of meaning claims that a linguistic expression is significant if the relevant idea is regularly associated with that expression. To say that it is regularly associated, is not to imply that the word is never uttered without being triggered by the idea. Locke who defends this theory, argues that most of the time we use language 'unthinkingly'. It implies only that there are occasions on which the occurrence of an idea give rise to the utterance of a particular word and that these are the basic facts from which human speech is derived. One way of putting this is to say that a word cannot be said to be used with specific meaning unless the speaker could call up the appropriate idea in connection with that word. The problem is that some words or sentences may not have distinctive idea for understanding their meanings. It may be that whenever I hear or speak a word whose meaning I know, such as the word 'increase' etc. I have a vague sense of familiarity with the word and I might term this sense as an idea of increase. But this would not be the sort of 'idea' demanded by Locke's theory.

It is F.H. Bradley¹⁰ who made a distinction between idea as image and idea as meaning. According to him, idea as image is the subject matter of psychology whereas idea in the sense of meaning is the subject matter of logic. Bradley criticised the British empiricists for having psychologized logic. Knowledge is judgemental and a judgement is a

relation between a subject and predicate. Thought proceeds through ideas in the sense of meaning. In this sense, there is close affinity between Hegel and Bradley. Further, both for Hegel and Bradley, thought, idea and meaning go together.

In Hegel's philosophy, idea has been conceived as developing logically and passing through three stages; objective, subjective and absolute. Let us examine briefly these three stages of idea. When we say that something is objective, we mean that it is outside us and that we cannot have direct access to it. Mc Tarrart is of the view that subjectivity and objectivity cannot be used in the sense of inner and outer, of what is thought and what is not thought respectively. He argues that subjective is capricious, contingent, while objective is universal and necessary. Hegel argues:

An objectivity is just as much a thought as subjectivity. What we are now dealing with is the universal and necessary idea of objectivity, the thought of the object¹¹.

Object and subject are related to each other. Subject without an object cannot be understood, so also object cannot be understood without the subject. But this does not mean that these two are not independent. The word 'object' means essentially the object of thought. Thought contains two terms, subject and object. To complete the truth that the world is thought, it must be conceived as object quite as much as a subject. To say that a thing is an object means that it essentially exists only for a subject.

In the universe, there are objects as well as subjects. God is the absolute object. It is viewed as the object of worship as

well as the subject who dwells in our heart. Hence, Idea is the unity of subject and object and it is the synthesis of the triad. The Absolute Idea is the personality, spirit and self-consciousness. It is the final presupposition of all categories. It is the foundation and presupposition of Being and other categories.

The Absolute is the World-reason, which is there in the world from all eternity. This world-reason is the system of objective categories and on the other hand, it is the system of subjective categories or concepts by means of which we do our thinking. Objective and subjective reasons are identical according to Hegel. The science of Idea is the source of knowledge of the crash world of matter and objects. It is all reality and it is the thought of thought; the concept of thought. If it is said of any object, say this hat, that book, that it "is", then it will follow by absolute necessity of logic that it is also "is not", that it "becomes", that it is a "cause", a "substance", and finally that it is thought, the Absolute Idea. Therefore, whatever objective or subjective categories are applied to the category of the Absolute Idea, the empirical world, the actual universe is not distinct from the Absolute. The real world is the Absolute. Even though the world and the Absolute are identical, there is a distinction between the two aspects. The categories are all valid description both of the world and the Absolute. The category of the world is inadequate, while the category of the Absolute is adequate and is a complete case of description. It is complete, full and final knowledge of the object of the world. The Absolute is self-subsistent, self-existent, true being and does not depend upon anything else at all.

If we define further the term 'Absolute', we get the following characteristic: The Absolute is the essence, the

essence of the world, it is the substratum, the underlying reality, the self-identical one, the first cause of the world. The Absolute is God. God, the Absolute is regarded as the universal. He is not empty abstract universal but is concrete Spirit, the infinite, the unconditioned, the super-sensuous, freedom, right and duty all together. The Absolute Idea or god is the absolute truth. It is the final, complete and adequate definition of the Absolute or God and of the universe. God is the thought of thought, the absolute subject-object. The world finds its truth in nothing but in the Absolute Idea. The world of truth is the thought of thought or Absolute Idea. It is the final truth and concrete whole.

In Hegel's philosophy¹², Idea is regarded as the spirit which is full and final truth of the universe. The Idea grows and develops itself out of its nature. Its developments are potentiality (*Ansich*), existence and actuality (*Fursich*, *Actu*). Let us discuss these three characteristics of the evolution of Idea.

- (a) **Idea has potentiality (*Ansich*):** Potentiality is capacity to exert power, possibility of coming into being, development or fruition. Idea has the potential nature to develop itself from something hidden. Hegel calls it under the name 'implicit', which stands for being 'in itself'. The *ansich* is the implicit, the potentiality as yet undeveloped, the self-identical, which is distinguished from *fursich* which means 'for itself', 'explicit'. According to Aristotle, the '*ansich*' is the possibility, matter is potentiality while form is actuality. Thus, matter itself is actually nothing, but it is potentially everything. It is the potentiality of all things. Form is, therefore, the actuality.

Hegel argues that the Idea is the process of development that comes to light from what is latent and hidden. For instance, a seed has potential characteristic to grow into a plant. A seed is simple, almost a point and little is visible in it, even when viewed through the microscope. But a seed contains the whole tree, its trunk, branches, leaves, colour, smell, taste, etc. and yet this simple thing is not the tree itself for its various qualities have not yet developed. It is therefore, to realise that there is something simple, containing in itself a multiplicity which does not explicitly exist, a state of 'implicit' becomes 'explicit'. The seed is the plant or tree in the implicit form. In itself, the seed is the oak. Thought perceives the oak in it. For a rational mind it is oak for us, but not yet for itself. It only becomes the oak for itself when it has actually grown into an oak. Thus, what is potential or latent is 'in itself' and what is actual is 'for itself'. Development, in this way, is not totally a new thing. In Hegelian terminology, development is a passage from the implicit to the explicit.

Another example for better understanding of the development of idea is the potentiality of 'I'. When I say 'I' this is very simple, an abstract universal, common to everyone; everyone uses the concept 'I' to refer to himself or herself. The 'I' contains varied ideas, drives, desires, inclinations, thoughts etc. It appears as a simple point but it has the force, the possibility of everything that a man could become out of himself. Man is already potentially present, say in an ape, though he is only actual in man himself. The

phenomenon of growth cannot be explained without the concept of 'implicit' and 'explicit'.

- (b) **The Idea develops into existence:** It develops itself from the potential state to the higher state of existence. Generally, existence means a state of reality. It means to be in specific time and place. When the Idea enters into existence it becomes something different from its original state. It appears as a true being as a seed becomes an oak tree. A plant lies hidden in the potency of the seed. Similarly, in the soul of man, the human spirit lies concealed. Everything that becomes man lies hidden in the simple 'I'. 'I' is only the seed; but ideas develop out of it. This is the movement of Idea. What we call 'existence' or 'being there', is an explication of the concept of the seed or the 'I'. Existence is thus, something explicated and unfolded. Anything that exists is a particular individual or thing occurring in definite time and place:

Only that exists which is a particular thing, an individual. "Whiteness" does not exist because it is not an individual object. But my white hat exists because it is an individual object. This also implies that existence appertains solely to time and space or both. For an individual thing must exist at least at some definite time, and if it is a material thing it must also exist at some definite place. Another way of expressing the same thought is to say that only that exists which is, or might be, an immediate presentation to consciousness. For what exists at a specific place or time is there, is present. These remarks apply, of course, just as much to psychic as to material entities. A dream, a feeling, or a thought, is there. It exists at a

definite time in the stream of conscious states. And it is an individual thing. It is this particular feeling, this thought, this dream¹³.

Thus, the spirit or Idea struggles to bring itself into existence, that is, to the state of explicitness. All knowledge, learning, insight, science and all actions have no other interest than to bring out, to produce, to make explicit what is potential and inner. It is generally argued that all existence is appearance. But the two terms 'existence' and 'appearance' have different connotations. Appearance is that which has only a dependent being. Existence is that which is individual and not universal, and is present at some particular place and time.

- (c) **Idea develops into actuality (Fürsich or Actus).** Hegel is of the view that actuality means explicit or 'for itself'. Actuality is the reality, a matter of fact. All logical inferences are considered worthwhile if they proceed from implicit to the explicit, if they pass from something known to something unknown. In a syllogism, the conclusion is implicit in the premises. The object of deduction is to make explicit what is implicit. A seed is a tree in implicit form whereas, the plant or tree is the seed made explicit. Hegelian deduction proceeds upon two-fold basis that the conclusion; the end or the Absolute Idea is presupposed in the premises. The conclusion of the syllogism presupposes the premises, so also the premises presuppose the conclusion. This is in fact a case of *Petitio Principii* or begging the question. Thus, the terms 'potential' and 'actual' are identical with the terms 'implicit' and 'explicit' respectively. Therefore,

for Hegel, the logical process is the passage from implicitness to explicitness.

The transition from appearance to actuality is quite simple. It is the passage from the inner to the outer. Essence and appearance finally get determined themselves as inner and outer respectively. But these two, that is, inner and outer collapse themselves to unity which is the actuality. Both inner and outer, when made actual, no longer remain separate but become identical in actuality. Hence, actuality is a kind of reality. Reality or actuality is the essence which manifests itself out of itself. The external world, the manifestation is not to be regarded as a veil which hides and obscures the inner being but on the contrary, it reveals the inner being and brings it to knowledge and light. Thus, to know the outer, is to know the inner, for the outer is precisely the revelation of the inner.

The question may arise now: Is the actuality rational? The reply is, yes, it is rational. But all existence is not actual. For example, the presence of evil, etc. They are mere phantoms, outward appearances which do reveal the inward reason of the world. Hegel is of the view that the definition of actuality as unity of inward and outward, involves the idea of necessity and necessity involves rationality. For him, necessity is the same as rationality:

We can see why the consequent follows the reason. The reason itself gives us the reason. In any train of valid reasoning, the conclusion must follow from the premises, and we see why. Solidification follows cold. We cannot see why this must be so. There does not seem to be any necessity in it. Cold might just as well be followed by anything else. But a reason must be

followed by its consequent. It is a logical necessity, and we understand this necessity. We could not deduce solidification from cold. The idea of cold does not involve the idea of solidification. But we deduce the consequent from its reason. The idea of the reason does involve the idea of the consequent. That is what is meant by saying that this consequent follows from that reason¹⁴.

Thus, the idea is the centre, at the same time the periphery, the source of light which in all its expressions never leaves itself but remains present and immanent in itself. Thus, it is the system of necessity, and of its own necessity which is thereby its own freedom too¹⁵.

There is only one life hidden at the beginning, and later on, becomes explicit and after that it converts itself into the stage for itself. For instance, a seed at the beginning, has the potency to grow into a plant and then unify itself into the stage of actuality, viz., 'for itself'.

According to Hegel, Idea is essentially concrete because truth is not abstract and what is abstract is untrue. Of course, philosophy moves in the domain of pure thinking but its contents are concrete. It is only understanding's reflection that produces abstractions and emptiness and clings to what is in opposition to truth. The healthy common sense of mankind demands the concrete. The Idea as pure thought is indeed abstract but in itself it is absolutely concrete.

Life of the idea is natural and spiritual, Idea does not die. Hence, it is wrong and irrational to describe God in such abstract expressions as *etre supreme* or supreme being, of which nothing further can be said.

Idea is regarded as the final stage of reason in which every knowledge is under the purview of a triad. In Hegel's philosophy, we find the terms such as Thesis, antithesis and Synthesis; Being, Nothing and Becoming; subject, object and unity of subject and object; subjective Spirit, objective Spirit and being—for—self, affirmative, negative and infinite, etc. Logic treats the Idea as it is in itself which is the Thesis. Nature is oppsite to the Idea in its otherness which is the Antithesis. Spirit is the unity of the Idea and Nature and is known as the Synthesis. Stace argues:

Nature as the antithesis of the Logical Idea is the opposite of the Idea. It is not the Idea. Yet we have already described nature as the Idea in otherness. Both statements are true. The relation of the Idea to nature is that of thesis and antithesis. Thus, it is the same as the relation of being to nothing, the first thesis and antithesis of the system. Nothing is, in the first place, different from being. It is not being. It is the opposite of being. In the same way, nature is the opposite of the Idea. It is not the Idea. But, on the other hand, being is identical with nothing. Nothing is being in the same way, nature is identical with its opposite, the Idea. It is the Idea. We have, as usual, identity in opposition¹⁶.

Idea is infinite, whereas Nature which is otherness of idea is finite. But Hegel also maintains that Nature is identical with Idea. In this way, Nature also is infinite. For, Nature is still the Idea and Idea maintains itself in Nature. Therefore, Idea is both finite and infinite. It is the true infinity; for it is unity in difference of finite and infinite.

Idea is the Synthesis of subject and object. It may be defined as the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. Hegel is of the view that the differences are retained within the unity which is for that reason, a concrete unity. The distinction between subject and object is sublated in the Idea, i.e. it is superseded and yet preserved. The two sides remain distinct within their identity.

The question may arise here regarding the relationship and distinction between Thought and Idea. How is Idea related to thought? Is Idea identical with thought? What is the distinction between Thought and Idea? Has Thought a wider scope than Idea? Such questions could be asked in this regard.

According to Hegel, Thought and Idea, though different, are also identical. This may sound contradictory but this is how Hegel and Hegelians argue. The British empiricists also use the terms 'idea' and 'thought' but in the hands of Hegel, they have been objectified. Thought, according to Hegel, does not stand either for mental process or mental content. Further, in Hegelian terminology, there is hardly any difference between physical and mental.

References

1. Hegel, G.W.F. *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Translated by T.M. Knox and A.W. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 54-55.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Stace, W.T. *The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition*. London: Dover Publication, Inc., 1923, pp. 8-9.
4. Hegel, G.W.F. *op. cit.*, p. 69.
5. Bosanquet, *The Essentials of Logic*, MacMillan, 1895, p. 75.

6. Edwards, Paul, *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 4, Macmillan, 1967, p. 134.
7. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, pp. 175-76.
8. Price, H.H. *Thinking and Experience*, London, 1953, p. 299.
9. Hamlyn, D.W. *The Stream of Thought*, PAS, W.S. Vol. 56, 1956, pp. 63-82.
10. Bradley, F.H. *Principles of Logic*, Oxford University Press, London, 1950, Vol. I, pp. 6-9.
11. Stace, W.T. *op. cit.*, p. 264.
12. Hegel, G.W.F. *op. cit.*, pp. 71-77.
13. Stace, W.T. *op. cit.*, p. 14.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
15. Hegel, G.W.F. *op. cit.*, p. 21.
16. Stace, W.T. *op. cit.*, pp. 116-17.



III

Thought and Mind

In this chapter, I wish to discuss the categories of Thought and Mind which are important constituents of philosophy of mind. I shall try to explain the views expounded by the masters on the topic concerned. But I think that it is worthwhile to present in brief, the historical background of these ideas than to go straightforward to the views of Hegel. It is philosophically very helpful to refer to Descartes, the father of modern philosophy before we discuss Hegel. For he is the only philosopher who propounded what is known as the official theory of mind¹. Later philosophers followed his footprints and started interpreting many other cognate theories in their own way.

According to Descartes, every human being, even the idiots and infants in arms have both body and mind. Body and mind are two basic independent substances put together. After death or destruction of the body, mind continues to exist and functions freely. This means that mind is free from bodily restrictions. On the other hand, body is like a house or prison where the mind is lodged. Therefore, the relationship between body and mind is contingent. Descartes argues:

By body I understand all that can be indicated by certain

figure; that can be comprised in a certain place, and so fill a certain space as therefore, to exclude every other body, that can be perceived either by touch, sight, hearing, taste or smell; that can be moved in different ways, not indeed of itself, but by something foreign to it but which it is touched... I am, therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind, understanding or reason—terms whose signification was before unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing, and really existent; but what thing?... It is a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, that imagines also and perceives.

Being in space, human body is subject to mechanical laws, having no desire, purpose, or potency to spontaneous motion. So man's bodily life is not different from natural events which can be publicly inspected as we inspect the lives of animals, reptile, trees, crystals and planets. But mind, on the other hand, is non-spatial, non-mechanical and cannot be inspected in the abovesaid manner.

According to the Cartesian view, a person lives through two collateral histories: (a) History concerning to what happens in and to his body, and (b) the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind. The human body is material, external, outer, extended and subject to laws of nature such as uniformity, causation, gravitation, etc. while mind is private because it is internal etc. The events that take place on the body are events in the physical world and those of the mind are in the mental world. The activities or functions of the mind are thinking, willing, feeling, desiring, judging, etc. in which consciousness plays an important role but matter, energy and motion play significant role in the functions or activities of the body.

Descartes is of the view that mental processes are not

universally similar. As a result, this theory also maintains that knowledge of one's own mind is radically different from that of other mind. Knowledge of my mind is immediate, direct. For instance, when I am in pain, I immediately feel pain and directly know it. When others are in pain, I know it only through externally exhibited behaviour. Nobody can be said to have direct access to the mind of others. From bodily behaviour of others, I came to know that others are also endowed with minds. But this comparison is not fool proof because it may be a case of pretension. Therefore, it is very difficult to accept and believe according to this doctrine that there do exist minds other than one's own.

It is argued by some philosophers that there is a causal connection between mind and body. What takes place in the mind affects the body and *vice versa*. The pineal gland is invoked to explain the interaction between body and mind.

The Cartesian theory of body and mind is not free from the criticism by subsequent philosophers. They do not approve the view that animals have no mind and that mind can exist without the body. The materialists reduce mind to body and recognize only the matter. They also claim that mind is the by-product of the matter. While the idealists reduce body to mind, thought or idea, recognize only the mind and argue that mind is the source of everything in the universe.

After understanding the historical background of Cartesian theory of mind, now let us try to examine Hegel's view of mind. Hegel, in his book, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, uses the term 'Geist' for spirit or mind. The concept of Geist refers to some sort of general consciousness, a single mind common to every person. Hence, the term 'Geist' is the central notion in Hegel's philosophy. But some of the interpreters are not happy with the translation of the term *Geist* as to stand for the mind

or universal consciousness or spirit. Hegel referred to it as the idea or the Absolute Idea, rather than as Spirit. Some translators wish to replace the word 'Geist' by 'Spirit' than by 'mind'. Here in this investigation, I wish to use both mind and spirit interchangeably for 'Geist'. While writing on Geist, Stace argues:

The word for mind here is Geist, which is equally well translated Spirit, and is the same word which is used to describe the subject matter of the Philosophy of Spirit in general. Thus, the word mind or spirit has two meanings for Hegel, a wider and a narrower, which must be kept apart. Firstly, it signifies in general the spiritual being whose development begins in anthropology and is continued throughout the whole philosophy of spirit. Secondly, it signifies in particular the highest phase of subjective spirit....³

According to Robert C. Solomon⁴, the problem is that if we translate Geist into 'mind', then we have to accept that the mind of two different persons are identical. But no two minds could be treated as identical. We might reject *Geist* as a name for a single universal mind, but maintain that Geist is the name of an abstract entity, like 'the average American tax-payer'. It abstracts from the differentials of the individuals and focuses attention on their similarities. Geist is the convenient way of talking about the common properties of a society, community of people or of all the people while ignoring, but not denying their differences. This sympathetic account of Geist eliminates the absurdity of talking about some mind common to all the people. For Geist is universal only in the sense that it is the name of that category which

explains everything. Geist also refers to a set of concerns, goals, beliefs and feelings. Similarly, we may sympathetically interpret Hegel's Geist as an abstraction that ranges over all human beings and with the help of Geist we talk about human consciousness without being concerned with the mind of any particular individual.

However, the definition of Geist as an abstract entity, does not explain Hegel's Philosophy. Moreover, it is contrary to Hegel's insistence that spirit of all things must be looked at in its concrete actuality. Therefore, the phenomenology of spirit is the study of something called Geist but not the invention of something abstract.

Further, if Geist refers neither to general consciousness nor to an abstraction from all men, what else might it mean? We might reasonably suppose that Geist refers to some sort of consciousness apart from the particular manifestation of it so that sense can be made of 'universal mind' without denying the clear fact that different people have different experiences, knowledge and etc. Hegel makes a sharp distinction between Geist and Soul,

"Soul being as it were, the middle term between body and spirit or the soul between the two⁵."

Hegel's view is that soul is a stable thing underlying all the particular manifestation of mind. This view is unacceptable because Geist cannot be separated from its manifestations, that is, it is not a thing, is not stable, and therefore, is not soul. Hegel says:

One word on the relation of rational to empirical psychology. The former, because it sets itself to apply

thought to cognise mind and even to demonstrate the result of such thinking, is higher, whereas empirical psychology starts from perception supplies. But if we propose to think the mind, we must not be quite so shy of its special phenomena. Mind is essentially active in the same sense as school men said that God is absolute actuality. But if the mind is active it must as it were utter itself. It is wrong, therefore, to take the mind for a processless *ens*, as did the old metaphysic which divided the processless inward life of the mind from its outward life⁶.

Hegel coined the term Geist by following his rational procedure. Geist is not just out there. It is neither seen in a single experience nor a set of experiences. We have argued that Geist is not the name of an abstract entity that it cannot be identified with the soul much discussed in traditional theology and that it cannot be identified with individual minds with their peculiar thoughts, feelings and so on. Yet it seems that Geist cannot exclude these special characteristics of individual minds. But if Geist is neither soul nor abstraction from particular minds, the question may arise: What is Geist? What is its origin? Is Geist related to the Kantian ego?

It has been remarked by scholars that Hegel's conception of Geist has its philosophical background and origin in Kant's Transcendental Ego. The Kantian 'ego' plays an important role in his epistemology. Hegel's Geist functions primarily as an ethical and religious concept. But both the philosophers are concerned with the possibility of absolute knowledge though Hegel was deeply dissatisfied with the Kantian critique of reason. His discontent was not given full hearing until the advent of *Science of Logic*, but he too often neglected

introduction to the *Phenomenology* is clearly a protest against Kant's theory of knowledge as well. For both Kant and Hegel, self-consciousness is the key to all knowledge and both the works, *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Phenomenology of Spirit* must be considered as treatises on self-knowledge. Thus, for both Kant and Hegel, the nature of knowing subject is the key to all philosophical understanding and Geist, I shall argue, plays the same vital rôle as the subject that Transcendental Ego plays in Kant's philosophy.

If it is argued that Hegel's Geist is a reinterpretation of an improvement on Kant's transcendental ego, we find instances in Hegel's writings to indicate that Hegel did consider Geist as a reinterpretation and improvement of Kant's ego⁷. Influence of Kant on Hegel cannot be denied. There are sufficient evidences to prove that Geist replaces Kant's 'ego' in Hegelian Philosophy and it removes certain philosophical difficulties and complications which Kant's 'ego' is incapable of resolving.

The concept of Geist is not only related to Kant's 'ego' but to Descartes' Cogito or "I think". The "I think" occupies a central place in both Kantian and Cartesian philosophies. It is not merely one of the self-evident truths but the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge. The Cogito or "I think" is the first principle of philosophical methodology and a criterion of philosophical truth. An analysis of "I think", would reveal that the concept of Geist reflects much of the Kantian transcendental 'I'. Hence, Geist like 'I', is the subject of all possible experiences and is not itself a 'thing' to which categories can be applied. Geist, like the "I think" is an activity; a process and not a thing lying behind our thoughts. Geist is the 'universal in action', as the 'I think' is the unifying activity in employment of universal concepts. The importance of the

“Cogito” or “I think” is that it knows itself or has reference to self. Geist is ‘being for self’, and its existence and the knowledge of its existence are the same. Hegel uses the term Geist in the sense of infinite and negative being as well⁸.

Both transcendental ego and Geist do not refer to any single individual or person. Geist is simply the underlying, unifying principle of consciousness and at the same time, the underlying rational will behind all practical reason and action. Geist is personal as well as the divine subject.

For Hegel, mind is the truth and the highest phase of the subjective spirit. The object is not independent of the mind. Still then, the object is not the subject; it is different from the subject, is integrally related to it. The object is not foreign to the mind. Mind functions in sense-perception and self-consciousness. The act of the mind is free and above the external world and it operates in its own world. The areas of its operation and jurisdiction are those of representation, thought and will.

The German word ‘Geist’ is translated into English both as spirit and mind. The treatment of ‘Mind’ by Hegel sometimes creates an impression as if he is doing empirical psychology. But we wish to point out that he is doing philosophical psychology. Historically speaking, during 18th and 1st part of 19th century when Hegel was writing, psychology had not developed into an empirical science. Psychology was still considered then as a science of the soul or mind and never as a science of behaviour. The word ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’ is used by Hegel both in a wider and narrower sense. In the wider sense, it signifies the spiritual being whose development begins in Anthropology and is continued throughout the whole philosophy of spirit. In the narrow sense, it signifies the highest phase of subjective spirit. Seen in this

light, it can be said that Hegel was doing philosophy of mind the sense in which Wittgenstein, Ryle and many others have done it in the present century.

The entire discussion on mind by Hegel has been classified by him into three parts: (i) Theoretical Spirit; (ii) Practical Spirit, and (iii) Free Spirit. This may create an impression that Hegel is dividing mind into three different parts; as if mind is an entity and three different parts perform three different functions. We wish to point out that the issues that Hegel raises under theoretical Mind are partly epistemological and partly conceptual relating to mind and its relation to knowledge situation. In other words, "Theoretical Mind" as a concept stands for philosophical analysis of knowledge in its particular form. Seen in this light, it can be said that there is no trace of transcendental metaphysics in Hegel's system. In fact, the more deeply we study Hegel, the more we are convinced that Hegel in his study of mind was doing philosophical analysis of concepts of mind and knowledge. This aspect of Hegel's philosophy is yet to be explored in detail.

Theoretical Mind or Spirit according to Hegel can be articulated in the following three phases: (i) Direct Intuitive Acquaintance (*Anschanung*); (ii) Imaginative Reproduction or Representation (*Vorstellung*), and (iii) Pure Thinking.

We have said earlier that Hegel was concerned with analysis of the concept of knowledge. According to Hegel, empirical knowledge involves a kind of unanalysed awareness like raw sensation. It is a kind of Buddhist *Svalaxsna* (pure sensation). It comes very close to *Nirvikalpa Pratyaksa* in Indian tradition. In this respect, we also find an echo of Kant in Hegel. Hegel terms this primary stage of knowledge situation as intuition. He accords intuition the lowest position

in knowledge situation. But at the same time, Hegel clearly states the defects of intuition. Its subjectivity is its greatest defect. It is something peculiar and private to the intuiting ego. It is a kind of subjective impression of the individual; it lacks all kinds of universality.

Hegel introduces two other notions such as attention and feeling to explain intuition. This may give an impression as if Hegel is doing empirical psychology. But the way Hegel defines attention, it is clear that he introduces this concept in order to state that knowledge is selective. That is to say that no knowledge is possible unless the individual is selective. In this sense, intuition is a kind of cognition. Cognition in this sense is related to 'feeling. At the stage of feeling the subjective becomes the objective. It involves a reference to objectivity. It is in this sense that it implies the outwardization of the inward feeling. Intuition is not just feeling. Only when the two elements of attention and outwardization are present that it becomes a fully developed intuition.

The Hegelian notion of intuition is reflected in F.H. Bradley's concept of 'that'. The 'that' of any knowledge situation is the uncategorized raw 'given'. We wish to point out in this connection that the Hegelian intuition is a logical requirement and not an empirical fact. That is to say that it is based upon the assumption that the speakable presupposes the unspeakable; the sayable presupposes the unsayable. If knowledge is sayable and speakable, it must be based upon something unsayable and unspeakable.

The immediate 'given' is surely the basis of knowledge but it cannot be treated as knowledge worth its salt. To use the Kantian phraseology, the 'given' in order to attain the status of knowledge must come under the categories; must be conceptualized. Thus, the conceptualization of the 'given' is

known as representation or reproduction. Stace remarks: The intuition thus freed from the external reference and made inward is representation⁹. Hegel too introduces the notions of recollection, imagination and memory to explain conceptualization of the given. Findlay argues:

Here the ownership by the thinking mind, implicit in the case of intuition, simply becomes explicit¹⁰.

Here again, it can be pointed out that Hegel is not doing empirical psychology but is trying to show what is logically involved in conceptualization of the given. According to Hegel, recollection, imagination and memory are integrally related to conceptualisation. Use and application of concepts presuppose recollection, imagination and memory. It may not be out of place to relate this aspect of Hegel's philosophy to Wittgenstein's famous metaphors of 'language game' and 'form of life'. At some stage or other, recollection, imagination and memory are bound to enter into application of concepts. Findlay argues:

Hegel is emphatic that such universal meanings are no mere by-product of mental picturing, the resultant of mutual attrition or mental chemistry. They are rather the actively ensouling *forces govern our* associative transitions¹¹.

Hegel offers sophisticated reasons for the fusion of subjectivity and objectivity. Findlay argues:

Hegel holds that such subjectively manipulated words are essential to thought. We only then know of our thought only then have actual, definite thoughts, when we are given these the form of objectivity, of a distinctness from our inwardness, i.e. the form of outwardness, and indeed of such an outwardness as also bears the impress of the highest inwardness. The

only inward-outward of this sort is the articulated tone, the word¹².

Hegel seems to be arguing in the manner of Aristotle that both the particular and the universal are inextricably fused. That is to say, the universal and the particular are distinguishable but are not separable. Findlay argues:

Since the sense, the universal, cannot really be separate from the thing which instantiates it, Word, Sense and Thing now become for Hegel identical; we reach an extraordinary fusion between nominalism, conceptualism and realism¹³.

Seen in this light, the question whether Hegel is a nominalist, conceptualist or realist does not arise at all. The 'immediate given' that starts as something very private and personal becomes impersonal. Findlay argues:

Theoretical spirit therefore starts by being something private and personal to which the real world stands opposed; its strategy is to transform that private personal life into an impersonal system of symbols in which the essence of the world will be fully captured and perspicuous. This capture is complete when our Thought takes the form of using precisely the right words to express the real facts, without any 'thinking' in the sense of fumbling about for the right expression. The pregnant phrase, that sums up the situation effortlessly, represent the fusion of word, Thing and Notion that we have now reached¹⁴.

Recollection, imagination and memory get consummated

in pure thought. Hegel visualizes imageless thinking. In this sense, he differs from empiricist philosophers like Locke who maintains that thinking is saturated with images. According to Hegel, there may or may not be images but it is no part of thinking at all. In this respect, Hegel comes very close to Wittgenstein who argues in *Philosophical Investigations* that images are not integral part of thinking. Thought overlaps the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Thinking has its content; it is the side of immediacy.

Another important concept that Hegel uses is Practical Mind or Spirit. Again this may create an impression that Hegel is doing empirical psychology. But we wish to point out that Hegel is trying to advance his views on epistemology and philosophical psychology. According to Hegel, knowledge is both a continuous process and a product. In this sense, it can be said that he does not accept the naturalistic view of knowledge. Knowledge is not given to us; it is made by us. A line of comparison can be made between Hegel and Wittgenstein in this sense. According to Wittgenstein, all seeing is seeing as.... This means that there is no seeing, no perception, no knowledge which is absolutely objective. The Kantian principle, that mind maketh nature finds its echo in Hegel. The Kantian categories are static but not dynamic. On the other hand, the Hegelian categories are dynamic; they grow and mould the object. The categories are related to a kind of will that is dynamic. The subject moulding the world by its own activity is will or practical mind. That knowledge is not just a natural event but is based on interest and choice and ultimately results in happiness is advocated by Hegel. In order to explain this aspect of his epistemology, Hegel introduces the notions of (i) practical sense or feeling, (ii) impulse and choice, and (iii) happiness. Hegel does not accept

the faculty psychology view that mind consist of distinct faculties like cognition, conation and volition or thinking, feeling and willing. Further, Hegel argues that knowledge, action and morality are interconnected.

According to Hegel, feeling is a kind of will. This will seeks to subdue the world to itself. At this stage, the object gets absorbed into the ego. Hegel characterises will as immediate. Will or feeling, according to Hegel, is an instinct to action: will stands for absolute particularity and immediateness. Such feelings also appear in moral, religious and political spheres. Feeling and reason cannot be set-up against each other; feeling and reason are not two things but one thing in different phases of its development. In fact, mind is a single being appearing in serially developed phases. Hegel argues that feeling is implicitly thought and is therefore guided by unrealised reason. But universality is hidden beneath particularity. Feeling makes this fact explicit.

Impulse and choice are two other notions which have been introduced by Hegel in this connection. According to Hegel, feeling contains a contradiction. The essence of the will is to mould the world into conformity with itself. Accordingly, a kind of propensity for action develops. These propensities are what are called the impulses. Impulse, inclination, interest are various names for this phase of intelligence. If one impulse becomes dominant in exclusion of others, it is known as passion.

It is to be noted in this connection, that Hegel differs from Kant in this respect. Kant rules out the role of impulse, passion and interest from the sphere of moral life whereas Hegel lays emphasis on the role of passion not only in the sphere of morality but also in the sphere of knowledge. Knowledge is passion based. According to Hegel, impulse and passion are

the very life blood of all action. Nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion, Kant's view is based upon the separation of the mind into independent faculties.

Though there is a multiplicity of impulses, yet the will is one and universal. When the will chooses one of the alternatives, the element of choice comes in. Stace argues:

The answer is that the will is the I, the pure ego. The I thinking is cognition. The I acting is will. It is one and the same I which is both¹⁵.

Hegel introduces the concept of happiness to explain the fulfilment of will. The satisfaction of will consists in conforming its content to itself. Hegel's argument is that since the will is universal, its satisfaction can only be attained by making its content universal. Will does not find satisfaction in the gratification of particular impulses and inclinations. The universal satisfaction sought by the will is known as happiness. Happiness, according to Hegel, is the state of highest fulfilment.

Hegel introduces the concept of free mind to explain the concept of freedom. Freedom, according to Hegel, consists in not being limited by another. In impulse, the will is not free because its impulse and its object which determine it are something other than itself. Free mind knows its other but this other is nothing other than itself. In other words, mind knows itself. So, in this sense, mind is self-determined and self-limited. Further, as it is self-determined it is also infinite.

Under subjective spirit, Hegel discusses certain fundamental issues relating to knowledge. It can be said in

this connection that according to Hegel, knowledge is not just given to us. It is made by us. That is to say, knowledge is a creation. It is made by men. In this sense, the Hegelian philosophy of knowledge anticipates instrumentalism and pragmatism which seek to relate knowledge with interest and choice.

The use of certain concepts like theoretical mind, practical mind and free mind are genuine innovation by Hegel. These three terms do not signify three different types of mind; they signify three distinct (though interrelated) categories in terms of which knowledge and human freedom could be meaningfully discussed and understood. As has been argued out earlier, Hegel being a revisionary metaphysician seeks to revise certain basic concepts like mind and freedom. Further, Hegel has also introduced the concepts of passion, interest choice in order to understand the concept of knowledge.

Objective Spirit

Spirit not only expresses itself in thought and ideas which can be termed as subjective in a special sense but it also expresses itself as social institutions, usages and prescriptions. This is otherwise known as the externalization of spirit. This doctrine of Hegel is triadically articulated into a section on Abstract or Formal Right, a section on Subjective Morality and the last section on Social Ethics which includes Hegel's doctrine of the State and History. Hegel was well versed in the concrete actuality of social arrangements. He repudiates both subjective and abstract morality. He offers preference for certain social arrangements in lieu of others. But what is most significant is that he tries to re-see or re-think these concrete facts. Hegel does not want to replace one set of historical facts by another

set but he wants to see them altogether from a different standpoint.

Hegel, along with Plato and Karl Marx, has been termed as a historicist and enemy of open society by Karl Popper. Neither we have any plan nor do we wish to comment on Popper's analysis of Hegel's philosophy of history. But we wish to point out in this connection that Hegel was engaged in higher order philosophical way of looking at the facts of experience. Hegel deals with a plethora of subjects like, law, liberty, ownership of property, contract, crime and punishment and a host of subjects. In fact, there is no aspect of human society which has not drawn Hegel's attention and not only in Nature but also in human society, Hegel discovers Spirit in its objective form. As we have argued out earlier in the course of the dissertation, Hegel as a revisionary metaphysician seeks to present an alternative picture of the universe including human society. But at the same time, he offers insightful remarks about many important social institutions. He defines State as the outgrowth of human reason. Further, he treats family as the most important of social institution and the relation that obtain between brother and sister as very sacred. Constitutional monarchy is held by Hegel as the best form of government. Similarly, Hegel maintains that among the religions of the world, Christianity is the highest expression of Spirit.

How does Hegel justify his position? What are his reasons for treating Christianity as the best form of all religions? 'These questions' cannot be answered by taking into account empirical facts. As a matter of fact, no religion is either better or worse than any other religion. The model of teleological evolutionism adopted by Hegel compels him to pick up one religion as better in lieu of another. There were both personal

and social reasons for Hegel to pick up Christianity for the purpose.

The use of the expressions 'subjective Spirit' and 'Objective Spirit' is likely to create an impression as if there are two type of Spirits. But we wish to point out that these expressions are used to denote two orders of Reality; Mind, Idea, consciousness, knowledge and thought belong to one sphere and state, family, morality and religion belong to another. These two orders of Reality cannot be explained without reference to Mind or Spirit. In fact, Mind or Spirit is central to understanding of anything. To be means to be intelligible, to be knowable and to be amenable to reason. In this sense only, Mind or Spirit is central to any kind of knowledge. Subjective and Objective Spirit are not two different categories; they are not two different Spirits but it is the self same central category which is used to explain and account for two orders of Reality i.e., one internal and subjective the other being external and objective.

References

1. Ryle, Gilbert. *The Concept of Mind*, Hutchinson, 1978, p. 12.
2. Descartes, R. *Meditations*, 1912. Translated by J. Veitch Dent & Sons Ltd., New York, pp. 87-89.
3. Stace, W.T. *Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition*, London, 1923, p. 362.
4. Solomon, R.C. *From Hegel to Existentialism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, pp. 3-17.
5. *Lesser Logic*, Sect. 34.
6. *Hegel's Logic being Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* (1930). Translated by William Wallace, Oxford University Press, 1975, Sect. 34.

7. Lesser Logic, Section 20.
8. Lesser Logic, Section 94-97.
9. Stace, W.T. *Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition*, London, 1923, p. 365.
10. Findlay, J.N. *Hegel: A Re- Examination*, London, 1958, p. 303.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
15. *Ibid.* as 9, p. 372.

IV

Thought and World

In this chapter, I wish to devote myself to an analysis of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, the World of Nature and the relationship between Nature and Thought. I shall deal with the questions such as: What does constitute the world? How are thought and the world related? I shall examine the Hegelian thesis that the world or Nature is an expression or unfoldment of thought. What does "unfoldment" mean in this context? How does Hegel escape from the charge of solipsism, subjectivism and mentalism? Such issues will be discussed in detail in this chapter.

In this context, the terms 'Nature' and 'World' will be used interchangeably. One can be replaced by the other without affecting the meaning. In the previous chapters of the dissertation, I have discussed such issues as what is Thought and what is Idea? Here in this chapter, I propose to explain briefly the meaning and definition of the terms 'Nature' and 'World'. What is Nature? What is Nature being contrasted with? Is Nature possible without Thought? Is man a part of Nature? and so on.

Hegel's Philosophy of Nature is not taken seriously by many scholars. Their argument is that this part of Hegel's-

Philosophy is not very important because it is based upon out-moded science particularly outmoded physics. But J.N. Findlay argues that this part of Hegel's Philosophy should not be ignored, Philosophy of Nature forms an integral part of Hegelian thought. He argues:

Nothing can, however, be more unfit than this ignoring, and in view of Hegel's undoubted greatness more impertinent. The Philosophy of Nature is an integral part of Hegel's system, and one can no more understand that system without taking account of it, than one can understand Aristotelianism while ignoring the Physics or the History of Animals, or Cartesianism while ignoring the physical portions of the principles of Philosophy. In Hegel's theory of Nature, as in the parallel theories of Aristotle and Descartes, one sees the philosopher's principles at work, casting their slant upon our talk and thought about the world around us. The complete misunderstanding of Hegel's idealism by British Philosophers and its reduction to a refined form of subjectivism, are probably due to their ignoring of the "Naturphilosophie!"

Findlay argues that Contemporary British Philosophers have misunderstood and misinterpreted Hegelianism. I am inclined to agree with Findlay on this point. Aristotelian physics, if there is any, is an integral part of Aristotle's metaphysics. Similarly, Hegelian Physics or Hegelian Science, if there is any, forms an essential part of Hegelian Metaphysics or Philosophy. In other words, one cannot be understood without the other.

Hegel is trying to present a teleological explanation of the universe as a whole. In this respect, Hegel is closer to Aristotle. Both Aristotle and Hegel have presented a teleological view of the universe as a whole. It is this: that there is a *telos* or a purpose towards which everything is moving. And the task before a philosopher is to unravel the mystical aspect of the universe. The reason why we characterize this aspect of Hegelian Philosophy as mystical is this: the purpose or *telos* is not visible to the naked eye. Further, no amount of causal or scientific explanation can unravel the purpose in the universe. Only an explanation in terms of reason could disclose this aspect of the universe. It is required, in this connection, to briefly explain the difference between explanation in terms of reason and explanation in terms of causes. Sciences offer explanation of events in terms of causes; scientists try to find out causes or effects of events. They don't try to find out explanation in terms of reason of the entire universe. Explanation in terms of causes or effects is piecemeal but explanation in terms of reason is ultimately bound to be totalistic. Further, explanation in terms of causes may lead to plurality of causes, whereas, explanation in terms of reason leads only to one cause, the first cause, the uncaused cause, the final cause of everything. In this respect, we find an echo of Aristotle in Hegel. Hegel's view on science, Findlay maintains is accurate and informed. Findlay argues:

Hegel's grasp of contemporary science was, moreover, informed and accurate: the reading of the *Naturphilosophie* is made easy by its wealth of experimental illustration, and by its long citations from contemporary treatises. Hegel gives one the science of

his own day, together with the interpretation he puts upon it².

The concept of the *Naturphilosophie* is not supposed to fit into empirical facts but they are to follow them generally. There is much in Hegel's thought which may not give any information about the world but it illuminates the science. Hegel's teleological way of viewing thing may not appeal to many but it remains a scholarly work as are those of Aristotle and Whitehead.

Nature, in its broad sense, may mean totality of things, all that would have appeared in an inventory of the universe. Nature consists of all elements of matter. It also includes the hills, mountains, valleys, rivers, plants, trees, etc. The problem may arise as to what nature is contrasted with and compared to in this context? The answer may be: Nature is contrasted with the conventional and artificial. What we call natural is not what we call artificial or conventional. The artificial and conventional are seen as interference, modified by alien causality. But Nature can also be taken to mean the mere raw materials for instance, the stone, tree, etc. What is natural is unfinished and preparatory, requiring artifice to complete and crown it. Nature is like a living and growing organism and suffused with life and intelligence.

Some philosophers argue that Nature is a pure machine, directed by divine intelligence. Others argue that Nature is neither permeated by mind nor is it a mechanism created by the hand of the mechanic but it is a self-transforming system, essentially temperal. Its development is best understood through the analogies of biological induction or human genetics/history. Nature is the cluster of everything found in the universe as a whole.

In certain context, man is contrasted with Nature, and in other, he is treated as part of Nature. To set man against Nature is to emphasize his distinctiveness such as rationality, creativity, and freedom, whereas Nature lacks these attributes. To count man as part and parcel of Nature is to emphasize the continuity of the works of men, animals, organic and inorganic spheres and suggest that human behaviour is amenable to the same kind of investigations that are effective in studying other domains of Nature.

Further, if Nature includes man, then it is contrasted with the supernatural. The idea of supernatural comes into existence from allegedly miraculous events, events which it is claimed, could not be explained through laws of nature. Our knowledge of Nature's powers and laws is itself derived from our experience and observation of events. What we judge to be possible depends on what reason we have to believe in certain things that happen.

According to Hegel, Nature is a dynamic process of thought which develops and grows. It is not static but grow through the process of change. For him, changes in Nature and indeed the origin of Nature are nothing but an outcome of logical process in the world of concept. Logical priority is the basis of temporal priority. God is the self-creating and self-subsisting unity of pure concepts. This is similar to the process of God's self-creative life.

J.N. Findlay, an outstanding Hegelian scholar maintains:

The most enlightening way to approach Hegelianism as a system, and the philosophy of Nature as one of its essential parts (which in a sense also includes the whole in itself), is to regard as an essay in Absolute

theory, an attempt to frame the notion or work out the logic of an Absolute, by which it to be understood something whose existence is both self-explanatory and all-explanatory, an inheritor, in short, of the religious conception of a god, as of the various materialism, idealisms, spiritualism, etc., whose objects have been given some of the notional ultimacy and uniqueness of God³.

It can be said in this connection, that Philosophy of Nature is an integral part of Hegelianism. Findlay points out that Hegelianism points in the direction of ultimacy and uniqueness of God. Some scholars question if Hegel was interested in any Absolute at all. In other words, it is sometimes argued that the Hegelian Absolute is different from the Absolute of any idealist. But we wish to maintain that Hegel in all his works was concerned with working out the logic of an Absolute. The supreme for Hegel is Absolute Idea. Hegel should not be taken to mean that the world is illusory and only the Absolute Idea is real. In other words, he is not an illusionist. In fact, the Hegelian Absolute Idea encompasses and contains all other things. F.H. Bradley, the British Idealist was influenced by Hegel in this respect. Bradley did not ignore the empirical world like Hegel. Hegel introduced Absolute Idea as an explanatory concept. A revisionary metaphysician like Hegel has to offer a basic concept in terms of which everything else could be explained. Hegel used the Absolute Idea to explain the universe of things and beings.

Findlay maintains:

Hegel is, however, singular as an Absolutist not only in holding that an element of contingency, of brute,

empirical facts, is demanded (not, of course, as regards its detailed content, but in respect of its general presence) by the very notion of his Absolute, but also that even in the regions where unity and total explanation 'in the end' prevail, there must be yet an initial, lower-level element of disunity and external irrelevance for such unity and total explanation to overcome, and it is only in overcoming such initial, and in a sense 'merely apparent', disunity and irrelevance, that it can be a unique, unified, all explanatory Absolute at all⁴.

But the so-called appearances are never lost in the Absolute Idea. In other words, they are preserved in the Absolute. Hegel's argument is that the Absolute must have an "other". This "other" incorporates an indefinite amount of lower level otherness in itself. As a matter of fact, the "other" is no other than Absolute Idea.

Nature, according to Hegel, is an integral part of thought. When thought is exteriorized it becomes Nature. In other words, Thought and Nature are part and parcel of the same thing. Findlay argues:

Nature may be said to be a realm of exteriorized thoughts, but of thoughts petrified and dismembered by exteriorization: it is, as Hegel romantically says, a Bacchic god unrestrained and unmindful of itself, and the task of bringing what is thus romantically distraught to the sober coherence of rational discourse must necessarily be an arduous and often unsuccessful one⁵.

The Hegelian Philosophical interpretation of Nature aims at discovering the unity of thing and being. In other words, its objective is to highlight the explanatory unity over what is apparently contradictory and opposed to each other. There can be two ways of viewing the Nature: One of the ways is to look at it as complete mechanical system. The other way is to look at it as an organic unity. Hegel does not accept the mechanical model; he upholds the organic model. But at the same time Hegel cannot be regarded either as an emanationist or evolutionist.

Findlay points out that Hegel is neither an emanationist nor evolutionist. In fact, Hegel does not maintain that Nature is a degeneration from more holy form. Further, Hegel is not an evolutionist in the ordinary sense of the term. Hegel does not mean that things in the world are progressively better than the previous one. Hegel was acquainted with the scientific facts and geological records available during his time. But he did not accept the scientific theory of geological evolution. According to Hegel, it is false and philosophically irrelevant to temporalize Nature and its notional stages are absolutely baseless. According to Hegel, the so-called natural stages are in fact logical stage to the existence of Nature: The completeness of Nature cannot be explained by appealing to various stages of evolution:

Its completeness lies in the ever-living. Now of present existence, in which Nature in all its forms is always totally present⁶.


Findlay points out that though Hegel is willing to temporalize the history of Man, yet he is not prepared to do the same to Nature. Findlay's reasons are that Hegel was very

timid and was not prepared and has some kind of distaste for scientific theory and moreover he lived in a pre-Darwinian age.

The particular analysis of Nature that Hegel gives is different from the one given by Jewish-Christian tradition. In the Jewish-Christian tradition, a kind of transcendent idealism is advocated. That is to say, it is believe in those traditions that God the Creator has created the world. In the mechanistic materialism of the Cartesian type though there is the absence of a creator yet it is advocated that matter is a kind of absolute; it is there and the entire universe could be explained mechanically. But the Hegelian concept of Nature is very different both from the transcendent and mechanistic and materialistic concepts. In fact, in this respect, Hegel is closer to Aristotle. Findlay argues:

Hegel's view of Nature is, in fact, a carrying to the limit of an immanent. Aristotelian teleology, in which Nature is to be understood as throughout working towards an end which will ultimately carry it beyond itself. It is arguable that this immanent teleology is a better and less prejudiced foundation for empirical investigations than the half formulated absolutisms current in natural science⁷.

Findlay argues that the teleological absolutism of Hegel is more satisfactory than the transcendent idealism of mechanistic materialism. Hegel seeks to present an integrated picture of the universe. Mind, Matter, Nature and its forms are integrated into an absolute unit. Hegel cannot be treated as a subjective idealist like Berkeley who argues that the external world including Nature is a series of perceptions. He is also not to be equated with Kant, Fichte and Schelling who



Thought and World

argue that the external world including Nature is a creation of synthetic mental activities. For Kant, the Phenomenon is a creation of human mind. Mind makes Nature—~~is the~~ viewpoint of Kant. Though Kantian Idealism is different from the subjective idealism of Berkeley yet both the forms of Idealism have something in common. It is this: The external world including Nature is ideational. Findlay argues:

His idealism is that of the Greeks and in this Idealism Nature, though subordinate, has an indefensible place and right, and is to be interpreted in terms of its own categories, which, though essentially linked with the ideal and the subjective, are reducible to neither⁸.

It is true that according to Hegel, the ultimate ground of Nature could be found in the Absolute Idea but it is not to be found in the mental construction of conscious beings. Findlay rightly maintains:

The ultimate ground of Nature may be in the Absolute Idea but it is not to be found in the mental constructions of conscious beings, even of a supreme conscious being⁹.

Hegel took special interest in studying the scientific material available during his time. In a sense, he could be regarded as the Aristotle of his time.

Hegel makes a distinction between Physics and Philosophy of Nature. One view is that Physics and Philosophy of Nature have nothing in common. Physics is purely empirical and Philosophy of Nature is conceptual. But according to Hegel, there is no such water-tight compartment between Physics and Philosophy of Nature. It is not that Physics is empirical

and Philosophy of Nature is conceptual; rather a lot of conceptualization enters into both of them. The only distinction is that the manner and mode of conceptualization is different in both the discipline.

Hegel makes a distinction between Nature as the totality of things and objects and Nature as all comprehending universal. Hegel argues:

The wealth of natural forms, in all their infinitely manifold configuration is impoverished by the all pervading power of thought, their vernal life and glowing colours die and fade away. The rustle of Nature's life is silenced in the stillness of thought; her abundant life, wearing a thousand wonderful and delightful shapes, shrivels into arid forms and shapeless generalities resembling a murky northern fog¹⁰.

It is very interesting to note that Hegel identifies Nature with God or the Spirit. That state of mind which perceives the unity of Nature and God is characterized by Hegel as the primal state of innocence. The reason that perceives it is known as the divine Reason. It is also known as the primal reason. In this sense, it is very close to fantasy. God is that Being in whom both Spirit and Nature are united. Hegel argues that there are certain favoured persons whom God imparts knowledge and wisdom in sleep. Further, even if, they are not favoured, if they share sufficient faith, can transport themselves to the primal state and can perceive the unity of Nature and Spirit. Hegel argues:

.... that such a state of perfect knowledge preceded the present history of the world, and that, since man's fall from his unity with Nature, there has remained

for us in myths, traditions or in other vestiges, still some fragments and faint echoes of that spiritual, illuminated state¹¹.

Hegel's argument is that there is a complete unity between Nature, Spirit and God. He does not advocate the theory of creation. In other words, Hegel does not advocate the Biblical theory of creation. There has been no creation in time. So, he argues:

God reveals Himself in two different ways: as Nature and as Spirit. Both manifestations are temples of God which He fills and in which He is present. God, as an abstraction, is not the true God, but only as the living process of positing His Other, the world, which, comprehended in its divine form is His Son; and it is only in unity with His Other, in Spirit, that God is subject¹².

If God is self-sufficient and lacks nothing, at all, why does he disclose Himself in something other? How does Hegel answer this question? Hegel answers this question by introducing the concept of "path of return". The divine Idea posits its other in the form of Nature and then Other also comes back to it. Nature is Spirit estranged from itself, Nature is implicitly the Idea and therefore, Schelling calls her petrified intelligence. Hegel makes a distinction between the Universal, the Particular and the Individual.

The universal is the Logos, the Idea and Nature in its infinity is the particular and the form of the finite spirit is the individual. As a return into itself individuality is Spirit, but as otherness with exclusion of all others; it is finite or human spirit. The particular and Nature lie in between the universal

and the individual. In fact, Nature is Spirit estranged from itself.

Hegel maintains that any rational consideration of Nature must consider how the Idea in its otherness sublates itself. Further, Idea is present in each grade or level of Nature. Estranged from the Idea, Nature is only the corpse of Understanding.

Nature is, however, only implicitly the Idea and Schelling, therefore called her a petrified intelligence, others even a frozen intelligence; but God does not remain petrified and dead; the very stones, cry out and raise themselves to Spirit. God is subjectivity, activity infinite actuality, in which otherness has only a transient being, remaining implicit within the unity of the Idea, because it is itself this totality of the Idea. Since Nature is the Idea in the form of otherness, the Idea, conformable to its Notion, is not present in Nature as it is in and for itself, although nevertheless, Nature is one of the ways in which the Idea manifests itself, and is a necessary mode of the Idea¹³.

Hegel examines the concepts of time and eternity. Finite things are said to be in space and time whereas, Spirit or Idea cannot be said to be either in space or in time.

The concepts of timelessness eternity relate to the concepts of Spirit and Idea. In other words, Spirit and Idea are neither spatial nor temporal. Spatiality and temporality do not apply to Spirit and Idea. In fact, what Hegel wishes to argue is that Nature is essentially ideality.

According to Hegel, Nature in its determinate form is not to be deified. Hegel argues: "In itself, in the Idea, Nature is

divine”¹⁴. Thus, Nature is the first born in point of time but the absolute prius is the Idea. Hegel argues: “This absolute prius is the last, the true beginning, Alpha and Omega¹⁵.”

Some philosophers argue that unmediated is the superior and the mediated one is inferior because it is dependent. Hegel’s argument is that Notion has both these aspects in it. Further, Hegel argues that the view that the belief in God is immediate cannot be regarded authentic. Nature-worship is the original and authentic worship of mankind because man immediately perceives Nature. The Notion manifests itself in Nature.

Nature is a totality. Different parts or elements are closely woven into each other in Nature. There is a necessary and not contingent relation among the various parts. Hegel does not accept either the theory of creation or the theory of evolution as advocated by the scientists. Hegel argues:

A thinking consideration must reject such nebulous, at bottom, sensuous ideas, as in particular the so-called origination, for example, of plants and animals from water and then the origination of the more highly developed animal organism from the lower, and so on¹⁶.

Hegel’s argument is that it is completely empty thought to regard species as developing successively in time. If Nature is regarded as a system, the most abstract term has to occupy the central position. Hegel also rejects the theory of emanation advocated by some oriental philosophers. If evolution talks of progression, emanation talk of regression. That is to say, those who advocate emanationism argue that things gradually proceed from the most perfect to the less perfect and so on.

To understand philosophy of Nature, one has to understand the basis and fundamental principles of Hegelianism. Various types of explanations, such as explanations in terms of causes have to be distinguished from explanations in terms of reasons. Further, the concepts of Being, Non-being and Becoming have to be distinguished from each other.

Philosophy of Logic forms an important part of Hegelian Philosophy. The doctrines of essence and appearance, subjective notion and objective notion, the concept of Reason and Idea, form another vital stage in discussion of Hegelian Philosophy.

Philosophy of Spirit both subjective and objective is another element in the study of Hegelianism. Subjective spirit incorporates under it, anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. Under objective Spirit, discussions are made on Art, Religion and Philosophy.

Philosophy of Nature comes in between the study of Logic and study of Spirit.

Philosophy of Nature presents us with a doctrine of evolution, a progress from lower to higher forms. But no time element is involved in the progress of evolution. One phase succeeds another not in order of time but only in logical order. Hegel was living in pre-Darwinian stage; consequently was not aware of the idea of organic theory of evolution. According to Hegel, nature has to be regarded as a system of grades of which one necessarily arises out of other. In this respect, Hegel's Philosophy of evolution resembles the Samkhya theory of evolution. The Samkhya philosophers, though advocate a theory of evolution yet it is not empirical one. It is conceptual

in nature. Similarly, Hegel's theory of evolution is not empirical but conceptual. Hegel refuses to believe in the origination and actual evolution of things and beings from very simple and elementary things. Similarly, it is not acceptable to Hegel that life originated in water and human beings evolved out of plants and other animals in due course of time. In fact, the very idea of evolution of plants, animals and human beings in point of time is repugnant to Hegel. Changes in things can be construed as developments only when viewed teleologically in relation to an end. Unless nature is moving forward towards an end there can be no advance, and therefore, no higher and lower. To say that something is higher is meaningful only when there is some standard. Modern science is suspicious of such an end. But to Hegel, the end is the actualization of reason. This end is approximately reached in man. The earlier is potentiality and the later is the actuality.

According to Hegel, Nature exhibits a triad of three stages which are treated respectively in—(1) Mechanics, (2) Physics and (3) Organics. Organic matter passes through three stages: (a) the geological organism comprising the mineral kingdom; (b) the vegetable organism; and (c) the animal organism. The animal organism is the final form of nature and constitutes the transition to spirit.

Mechanics

According to Hegel, mechanics is a branch of knowledge that deals with self-externality of nature in its complete abstraction. It also deals with self-externality as individualized including matter and nature in its free motion. Hegel argues:

The first or immediate determination of Nature is space: the abstract universality of Nature's self-

externality, self-externality's mediationless indifference. It is a wholly ideal side-by-sidedness because it is self-externality; and it is absolutely continuous because this asunderness is still quite abstract, and contains no specific difference within itself¹⁷.

According to Hegel, space is non-sensuous sensibility and a sensuous super-sensibility. This may appear contradictory and confusing. In order to avoid this contradiction, meaning of these statements must be made clear. Space is the form of universal externality and otherness. So, things in Nature must be in space. As regards the three spatial dimensions, Hegel finds in them a reflection of the three determinations of universality, specificity and individuality. Hegel appears to have been influenced by Kant in respect of Space and Time but unlike Kant, he treats Space and Time inseparable. A position in space is nothing unless coupled with a moment of Time "Here" is inseparable from "Now" and *vice-versa*. This view of Hegel on Space and Time comes very close to modern views on it. Hegel, like the French Philosopher, Henry Bergson and many others reject the spatialized view of time. He repudiates the view that time as a matter of fact could be divided into past, present and future. There is no past, present and future except the eternal present. Further, Hegel argues that Space and Time are aspects of Motion. Motion is inseparable from Matter from what is movable. Hegel points out that we in general start with Matter and then look to Space and Time. On the other hand, the fact of the matter is that Matter is what is real in Space and Time. Hegel does not stop there. He seeks to enter into discussion on the scientific concepts of gravitation, centripetal and centrifugal forces and etc. Hegel argues that Newton advocates the mechanistic view

of planetary motion whereas Kepler advocates what is known as organic view of it. He is inclined to agree with Kepler. There may be dispute as to which scientific theory has more explanatory power and for that matter acceptable. But the Hegelian Philosophy of Nature cannot be assessed in scientific terms. His organic view of reality pervades his Philosophy of Nature.

In line with Platonic and Aristotelian terms, Hegel argues that the heavenly bodies are not governed by mechanical forces but none in their own ways like blessed gods. That is why, he defends the organically unified astronomy and cosmology of Kepler opposed to dualistic and mechanic hypothesis of Newton. Defending the organic view of Nature advocated by Hegel, Findlay argues:

If Hegel's mechanics is too 'organic' for our modern taste, it is nonetheless far from absurd. Possibly, too, there may ultimately prove to be more of Keplerian organism in an assemblage like the solar system than our science has unthinkably denied¹⁸.

Physics

From Mechanics, Hegel passes on to Physics proper. It deals with various elements out of which the natural world is composed. These include the traditional elements of Fire, Air, Earth, Water and Light. Then Hegel discusses the four material properties of specific gravity, cohesion, sound and warmth. Finally, he discusses the Physics of Total Individuality which covers the phenomenon of Magnetism, Crystallization, Refraction, Colour, Taste and Smell.

Of all the elements, Hegel accords high position to light. It is light by means of which things become visible to us. So,

Hegel argues that light represents its reality. He also treats Light as a lower form of the all pervasive self-sameness of the Ego. Like some Indian and Greek Philosophers, Hegel accepts the elemental theory of the universe. But he also advocates an ascending theory series of determination, matter becomes increasingly self-centred. Findlay has rightly pointed out:

Our summary has made Hegel's treatment sound more of a fairy tale than it actually is, since in him elements of interpretation are subtly mixed up with detail of science¹⁹.

Hegel's interpretation of colour and electricity is very fascinating. This shows how he bends even Nature to his metaphysical model. The colour "red" is regarded as the kingly colour that is opposed to darkness. There is no scientific explanation for this type of view. Perhaps, this is not scientific. But Hegel would insist on this. Further, regarding electricity, Hegel has a strange view. According to him, Electrical Relationship is a direct expression of the selfhood of a body in relation to other bodies. Electrical tension is the proper selfhood of the body very strangely. Hegel treats electrical tension as the expression of the anger of a body. Further, he treats it as the snarling of a hostile dog. We wish to point out that Hegel, in his treatment of Nature is not free from picture thinking. He argues that Nature is a kind of prose, organism is a kind of poetry.

Organics

As we have pointed out earlier, organic matter passes through the geological organism comprising the mineral kingdom, the vegetable and animal organism.

The dialectical process also operates in the sphere of organism. When the Infinite determines itself, it becomes ideality. Life is the result of constant differentiation of matter into separate organs and functions. The Earth provides the basis and background of life. This is followed by a treatment of Vegetable and Animal organism, the last being the crown of Nature and the matrix of self-conscious, spirit. According to Hegel, the Earth assumed its present shape after undergoing so many cataclysmic changes. Thus, the pre-organic state of the Earth has no interest for Hegel. From a philosophical standpoint, the natural world is timeless and a-historical because its aeons of past development contributes nothing to our understanding of it. As we have said earlier, Hegel was not interested in the details of scientific investigation of Nature but in philosophy of it. So he argues that the self of a plant is the light towards which it constantly turns, were it conscious, this light would be its God. Here, as elsewhere, Hegel makes use of the strange intuitions of Goethe. That is to say, the plant is a mere half-way house between a geological phase and an organism delimited in time. Hegel argues that in due course of time, the vegetable organism passes into the animal organism. He seeks to give detailed description of digestive and glandular system. He also talks of sexual reproduction. Some of these descriptions are of no scientific importance at all. But what is important and significant is that all these descriptions are the teleological and organic view of Nature. He compares the animal organism to a solar system. An animal organism, according to Hegel, reveals an ideality which renders it independent of a precise position in space.

Hegel treats the concept of death with all seriousness. In this respect, he comes very close to some of the Brahminical traditions in Indian Philosophy. The aim of Nature, Hegel

argues, is to embrace its own death. It has to burn itself like a phoenix. Death and disease are the inadequacies of organism.

Findlay Maintains

In old age the Universal becomes 'bogged down' and 'physicalized' in the routine that it has built up. Having no longer an 'other' to work upon, or a task to perform, it must be of necessity depart or withdraw²⁰.

Regarding death Hegel argues:

Above this death of Nature, from this dead husk; proceeds a more beautiful Nature, Spirit. The living being ends with this division and this abstract coalescence (to form together so as to form a single mass) within itself²¹.

Death has been conceived by Hegel as a kind of liberation. In death, the spirit comes to realize itself. Before we conclude this chapter we wish to reiterate the point that the idealism of Hegel is different from subjective idealism of Berkeley and others. He does not reject the so-called material or physical world. In fact, he takes a lot of interest in the study of Nature, including gravitation, magnetism, sexual reproduction and so on. This shows that Hegel was convinced that philosophy and science are two different disciplines and their subject matter is also different. In short, philosophy is neither a super science nor on par with the sciences. It is a distinct discipline having distinct subject matter of its own. As a revisionary metaphysician, Hegel seeks to revise our conceptual structure. He argues that the scientific way of looking at the world is not the only way. There are alternative ways of looking at it.

Philosophy offers an alternative way of looking at the world. A kind of teleology which can be characterized as dialectical teleology pervades Hegelianism. In this respect, Hegel comes very close to Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. Treatment of death as a kind of liberation brings Hegel close to some Indian traditions. There is no evidence if Hegel read Indian Philosophy or was acquainted with Indian traditions which treats death at least as a kind of temporary liberation.

But the fact remains that one comes across a close conceptual affinity between Hegel and some Indian philosophical traditions. Hegel argues:

.... to find in this externality only the mirror of ourselves, to see in Nature a free reflex of spirit; to know God, not in the contemplation of Him as spirit but in this His immediate existence²².

References

1. Findlay, J.N. Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 267.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 267-68.
3. A.V. Miller (Trans). Hegel Philosophy of Nature, with Foreword by J.N. Findlay; Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970, p. ix.
4. *Ibid.*, p. x.
5. *Ibid.*, p. xiv.
6. *Ibid.*, p. xv.
7. *Ibid.*, p. xxiv.
8. *Ibid.*, p. xxv.
9. *Ibid.*, p. xxv.
10. A.V. Miller (Trans.). Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, p. 7.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
18. J.N. Findlay. A Re-Examination, p. 277.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
21. A.V. Miller (Ed.). Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, p. 443.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 445.

V

Logic of Dialectic

This chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the concept of Dialectic and the dialectical method as used by Hegel. Hegel's Philosophy is otherwise known as the dialectical philosophy and his method of philosophizing is also known as the Dialectical Method.

The English word 'dialectic' is derived from two Greek words, 'Dia' and 'Legien' which mean discourse, debate, discussion and so on. Historically speaking, many philosophers have used the so-called dialectical method. But Hegel has been regarded as the master dialectician in history of European Philosophy.

The Hegelian dialectic has been severely criticised on many counts. It has often been said that Hegel seeks to derive everything including human history, art, morality etc. and so on from certain basic principles with the help of the dialectical method. In the course of the chapter an attempt will be made to unearth and unravel the logic of Hegelian Dialectic and Dialectical Method.

Dialectic and Dialectical method are closely connected with the concept of explanation. To explain certain things means either to find out causes and reasons. But explanation

in terms of causes either moves in a circle or it leads to the idea of first cause which is uncaused. Further, causal explanation may find out the 'how' of a thing or phenomenon but it cannot find out the 'why' of it. Philosophy, according to Hegel, aims at explaining the universe as a whole and causal explanation cannot offer any totalistic explanation. Explanation in terms of causes and effects are bound to be piecemeal. In other words, it cannot explain the universe as a whole. Again, for Hegel, the only genuine explanation which is totalistic is the explanation in terms of reason.

Explanation in terms of causes and effects cannot explain purpose, goal and objective. It may be mentioned in this connection that Hegel's firm faith in the competence of teleological explanation compels him not only to seek for it in respect of individual phenomenon but in respect of the whole universe as well. This insistence on teleological explanation has forced Hegel to introduce concept like, thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, being, non-being and becoming in elaboration of the manner and mode of what is known as the dialectical method. These concepts are central to understanding of Hegel's Philosophy in general and dialectical method in particular.

Now the question is: how does Hegel arrive at such concepts as thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis or being, non-being and becoming? Hegel arrives at these concepts through a philosophical analysis of various objects of knowledge. We know various objects, human beings, animals and etc. We say, for example, that there are tables and chairs in the room. But what do we mean by a table or a chair? The empiricists maintain that an object is a combination of simple ideas and these ideas are dependent on the perceiving mind. On the other hand, Hegel maintains that an object is a combination

of universals. According to Hegel, what is known as a table contains a set of universals. How do we characterize a table? A table is characterized through length, breadth, height, weight, colour and the material out of which the table is made. But height, weight, length, breadth and colour are universals or concepts. They are there in the world.

We wish to point out that Hegel is a Platonist. That is to say, Hegel accepts the Platonic position that universals or concepts have objective existence; they do not depend for their existence on the perceiving mind. But when we take away these universals one by one from the table what remains is its "Isness". But what is this 'Isness'? It is the pure being bereft of any kind of description. "Is" is the last possible abstraction. It is the highest possible abstraction. Hegel terms it as the Being or Thesis, "Being" in this sense is the first category. "Being" in this sense is presupposed by and logically prior to all other categories. For example, quantity, quality, cause, substance, all presuppose the Being.

But what is this Being or Thesis without the attributes? In other words, what is left out of a table after such attributes as length, breadth, height, weight and colour are taken away one by one? The answer is that nothing remains after an object is bereft of all the attributes. In fact, the so-called Being is nothing or Non-Being. In other words, the "Being" is as good as non-Being and the non-Being is the same as Being. But at the same time, Being is opposed to non-Being and non-Being is opposed to Being. In fact, Being and non-Being are opposed to each other. Being and non-Being are mutually contradictory. But at the same time, since Being is the same as non-Being, Hegel argues that "Being" becomes the non-Being. So, Hegel argues that Becoming or Synthesis is another category. It is in the "Becoming" that "Being" and "non-Being" are reconciled in

a kind of synthesis which is termed as "Becoming" by Hegel. So, if "Being" is positive "non-Being" is negative and both the positive and negative categories are synthesized in the Becoming. But what is this "Becoming"? "Becoming" is that category where both "Being" and "non-Being" are synthesized. This means that there are both "Being" and "non-Being" in the "Becoming". This means that "Becoming" contains both "Being" and "non-Being". But "Being" is the same as non-Being. Consequently, the "Becoming" or Synthesis is also a kind of Being. In other words, "Becoming" or "Synthesis" is also a kind of "Being" or Thesis. As a result, a new thesis or Being emerges and it implies its own contradictory that is a non-Being. The fresh Being and non-Being get synthesized in a Becoming and thus giving rise to another Being and so on. Now the question is how long this process goes on? Hegel's answer is that the process goes on till all the contradictions are resolved and the highest idea or the Absolute Spirit realizes itself. The entire process is known as the dialectical process. It is a zig zag process. The Being or thesis negates itself in order to be resolved into a higher synthesis.

The Hegelian dialectic has evoked both appreciation and criticism in many quarters. Now the question is: how to understand the Hegelian dialectic? Has Hegel really contributed something to philosophy or he has simply indulged in verbal jugglery? These are some of the important questions which will be answered in the remaining parts of the chapter.

First of all, it is not clear if Hegel used a single technique or method which could be characterized as a dialectical method. As for instance, when he talks of Being, Non-Being and Becoming he uses one technique. It is not exactly, a deductive method. He makes use of a typical semantic analysis of these key concepts. Further, when he talks about social

and political institutions like; family, state, and art, morality, freedom, liberty and so on, he follows altogether a different technique. There he expresses some of his convictions about these concepts while maintaining that family is the basic and most important of social institutions. Hegel, apart from expressing his preferences for these concepts, advances other sociological reasons in support of his argument.

It is usually held by scholars that Hegel's dialectical method is a kind of deductive method. In other words, dialectic is a deductive system. That is to say, the entire Hegelian Philosophy can be construed as a deductive system. In any deductive system, there are certain primitives or basic postulates which are taken for granted. Further, there are certain rules of inference. The basic postulates along with the rules of inference give rise to all the theorems. This is how a deductive system is conceived in mathematical logic and mathematics. The basic postulates cannot be proved within the system. In fact, no proof exist for them with the system. But a proof can be constructed for them outside the system. This is how the distinction is made between theorems and meta-theorem in a deductive system. Theorems are those which are proved within the system, meta-theorems are those for which a proof exists outside the deductive system.

Now let us examine if the Hegelian dialectic could be regarded as a deductive system? Hegel discusses the constructive deductive method in his account of the analytic method of arithmetic and of the synthetic method of geometry. He argues that though such methods are effective and fruitful in their own fields yet they are useless in philosophical reflections. Kant maintains that the proposition " $7 + 5 = 12$ " is synthetic a priori in nature. It not only gives information but is also necessary. According to Hegel, such a proposition

is purely analytic. It is a tautologous consequence of the definitions and rules of the number system. In *Science of Logic*, Hegel also argues that the truth of this proposition can also be established by machine. (*Science of Logic I*. p. 261). It is not into such propositions that dialectic enters. In other words, according to Hegel, mathematics is not at all dialectical and dialectic has nothing to do with mathematics or a deductive system. It is only when mathematics goes beyond the situation with which it is adapted to deal that it becomes involved in contradiction and conflict and becomes dialectical on the fringe only. Otherwise, it is not proper to regard mathematics as dialectical. As for instance, "2 and -2" never give rise to another number, they cancel each other. In dialectic, such a situation will give rise to a new moment.

Hegel introduces two different concepts such as Understanding and Reason to explain his position. But by Understanding and Reason, Hegel does not mean to say that they stand for two different faculties of mind. Rather, Understanding and Reason stand for two different types of thought or arguments. As for instance, a type of thought or argument that deals with definitions of terms and derivation of conclusion from certain well defined basic postulates in accordance with a set of rules of deduction it is, according to Hegel is an instance of Understanding. Findlay argues:

The Understanding, we may say, cuts off the corners of our ideas all the fine penumbra by which they shade into other ideas, or imply them without plainly including them; it also checks the tendency of our ideas and principles to shift and transform themselves into other ideas and principles when faced with unwanted cases or question¹.

Having defined concepts in neat terms one can play any type of game one likes. In other words, Hegel treats mathematics and for that matter, any kind of deductive system as a kind of game. It has nothing to do with the empirical reality. Using Wittgenstein's phraseology one can say that mathematics or deductive system is a language game and like any other game, it has its own rules and logic. About Kant's views on synthetic *a priori* nature of mathematics Hegel maintains:

The sums 5 and 7 means the mechanical conjunction of the two numbers, and the counting from seven onwards thus mechanically continued until the five units are exhausted can be called a putting together, a synthesis, just like counting from one onwards; but it is a synthesis wholly analytical in nature, for the connection is quite artificial, there is nothing in it or put into it which is not quite externally given².

In the similar vein, Hegel rejects the Kantian view of pure geometry that it is synthetic *a priori* in nature. Kant contrasted Understanding with Reason. According to Kant, the categories of Understanding are applied to the materials of experience. Reason, on the other hand, seeks to apply these categories on and beyond the very horizons of experience. That is why, Kant talks of Antinomies of Pure Reason. When Reason soars beyond experience, antinomies and contradictions appear. But the later German idealist have reversed this preference. Hegel, for example, argues that Reason is the highest mode of cognition which emerges out of Understanding through Dialectic. Understanding is the beginning of all philosophy but it is not the end all. As a matter of fact, only when

Understanding goes beyond itself and absorbs all contradiction and negations that thought attains enrichment. Abstractions and one-pointedness of Understanding is very much necessary in the beginning but only when thought leads and shades off into the 'other' than it becomes richer, fuller and bolder. Understanding is not only active in certain kinds of systematic metaphysics it is also active in other fields of knowledge. Findlay argues:

Understanding is not, of course, limited to systematic metaphysics; it is present in the less systematic reasoning of empiricist philosophers, or in the disjointed dogmas of a philosophy of common sense, of the sound human understanding. It seems plain that Hegel would have regarded practically all British realism, empiricism and analytic philosophy in the present century as a philosophy of the Understanding, and would probably have admired it for being uncompromisingly so³.

In Dialectic the one-sidedness of Understanding gets overcome in anti-thesis and complementarity. The anti-thesis and complementing of a concept is not opposed to it; rather they enrich and help in the development of the original concept. If Understanding is one-sided and abstract. Dialectic is many-sided and concrete in nature. Further, Dialectic moves with what is known by contradiction and Hegel, in this connection, may be charged with inconsistency and logical flaw. But his argument is that contradiction is not only the law of thought but also the law of the world. Hegel argues:

Being is being, and nothing is nothing, only their contradistinction from each other; but in their truth,

in their unity, they have vanished as these determinations and are now something else. Being and nothing are the same; but just because they are the same they are no longer being and nothing, but now have a different significance⁴.

The contradictions and anti-thesis are not subjective in the sense that they do not arise out of any conceptual or linguistic misunderstanding. In fact, contradiction and anti-thesis are in a way inherent to concepts and categories that we apply in talking about the world. Hegel would agree with Wittgenstein that philosophical perplexities have a 'deep seated' character. We feel a mental cramp when we adhere to too rigid way of conceiving and talking about the world at large.

Hegel does not agree with philosophers who argue that contradictions are only apparent and not real. For him, Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progress. In this sense only Dialectic cannot be identified with sophistry. Philosophical scepticism both ancient and modern are testimony to inherent nature of Dialectic. Scepticism is the symptom of 'great cognitive despair', to borrow the expression from J.N. Findlay. The ancients tried to transcend the fixed forms of Understanding but they could not offer any suitable solution to it.

Hegel is full of praise for Kant for the latter's concept of antinomy. Antinomy is a kind of contradiction or conflict. According to Kant, there are certain concepts which can be applied only to phenomenon and not to the noumenon. When we start applying these concepts to the noumenon antinomies or contradictions appear. On the other hand, Hegel recognizes the presence of such antinomies and contradictions in objects of all types and in all notions and ideas. Hegel argues:

The solution of these antinomies, as of those previously mentioned, is transcendental, that is, it consists in the assertion of the ideality of space and time as forms of intuition—in the sense that the world is in its own self not self-contradictory, not self-sublating, but that it is only consciousness in its intuition and in the relation of intuition to understanding and reason that is a self-contradictory being. It shows an excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradiction from it and then to transfer the contradiction to spirit, to reason, where it is allowed to remain unresolved. In point of fact it is spirit which is so strong that it can endure contradiction, but it is spirit, too, that knows how to resolve it. But the so-called world (whether it be called an objective, real world or, according to transcendental idealism, a subjective intuition and a sphere of sense determined by the categories of the understanding) is never and nowhere without contradiction, but it is unable to endure it and is, therefore, subject to coming to-be and ceasing-to-be⁵.

Hegel argues that both Dialectic and Contradiction are basic principles of everything. In all activities such Dialectic is manifested in the movement of all heavenly bodies in all political and social upheavals and in all forms of governments including monarchy, anarchy and despotism. Everything in the world involves opposed and contradictory aspects. At the same time, Hegel uses the terms 'contradictory' and 'untrue' in a manner quite different from the ways in which contemporary thinkers use it. If Dialectic creates or leads to contradiction Reason or Speculative thought succeeds in uniting or reconciling opposed characteristics.

In this respect, Hegel likens a reasonable person with a mystic in religion. A mystic is one who tolerates near contradictions in reporting his experience. Thus, they reject the opposition between God and soul, infinite and finite. The theological metaphysicians locate God in a world beyond the universe of experience. Hegel, on the other hand, belongs to the group of immanent mystics opposed to transcendent mystics. The latter present one-sided picture of God while Hegel repudiates it. He believes in a kind of synthesis where oppositions and contradictions vanish altogether. Findlay argues:

Such a unity passes our comprehension and trust involve elements which are permanently mysterious. Whereas for Hegel it is not thought in general, but only a particular class of thought, to which a reasonable solution seems opaque⁶.

Let us now examine how Hegel connects Dialectic with the triad or with triplicity. Dialectic involves triplicity of stages. There is a movement from the initial stage of positiveness and stability through contradiction. In the third stage, there is an accommodation where there is relative stability. Further, this synthesis gives rise to contradiction so on and so on. One view is that this triplicity could have developed into quadruplicity, quintuplicity and so forth. Why does Hegel make use of triplicity of Dialectic? Hegel cites historical reasons for having chosen the triplicity of Dialectic. He argues that both the Pythagoreans and the Neo-Platonists—used this type of Dialectic. He gives credit to Kant for having discovered the essential nature of triplicity in Dialectic. Kant used it in drawing up his categories. As for example, in Kant 'Limitation'

combines both 'Reality' and 'Negation'. Further, the various stages of Dialectic have a kind of necessity in them. But this necessity is different from the one characteristic of mathematical-deductive system. As a method, Dialectic is the moving soul of all sciences. In a mathematical system there are many starting points and proof that may take alternative direction. But in Dialectic, both the starting points and the lines of proof are unique. According to Hegel, each stage is the 'nullity' of the immediately previous stages. He falls back even on empirical evidences in support of his Dialectic. A seed, for example, is regarded as thesis and a sprout an antithesis and the seedling as the synthesis. In the similar manner, an infant may be regarded as a thesis, an adolescent, an antithesis and youth a synthesis. The unilineal Dialectical chain keeps on twisting and twirling until it returns to its point of origin. The point of origin is the self-conscious spirit. This is how Hegel lays emphasis on primacy of self-conscious spirit.

The Dialectic is also reflected in the sectional divisions of Hegel's writings. The Phenomenology of Spirit is divided into; (A) Consciousness, (B) Self-Consciousness, and (C) Reason. Consciousness is subdivided into (a) Sensuous Certainty, (b) Perception, and (c) Understanding.

In the Encyclopaedia, the triadic division follows a simpler and mere intelligible course. The principal triad consists of the Science of Logic, which studies the Idea in the abstract medium of thought, the Philosophy of Nature, which deals with the same idea in its self-alienation and self-externalization, and the Philosophy of Spirit, which studies the idea in its return to itself from self-alienation. But at the same time the fact remains that Hegel does not strictly follow the triadic principle in dividing chapters and sections of his

writing. It also shows his conviction of the authentic nature of Dialectic as a method. But his triads vary from situation to situation. Being, Non-Being, Becoming, Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis are not used in the same sense and with same force equally well in all cases. The first member of the triad in the Dialectic is not at all a fixed category. In fact, anything, any concept and any category such as man, tree, book and etc. can be used as the first member of the triad. In this sense only the first member of the Hegelian triad is different from the Euclidean postulate. 'Being' and 'Thesis' are not of the same type, say, 'man' and 'tree'. 'Being' and 'Thesis' are not things or objects in the sense in which 'man' and 'tree' are. 'Being' and 'Thesis' can be construed as meta-linguistic in nature. They are concepts or rules in terms of which things and objects could be classified.

Now, let us discuss the second member of the triad. Is the second member a negation, contrary or contradictory of the first member? 'Being' and 'Non-Being', 'Thesis' and 'Anti-thesis' may be treated as contradictory like 'A' and 'not A', but is the second member contradictory to the first one in this sense? Our answer is that if 'Non-Being' is contradictory to 'Being' then there cannot be any meeting point or point of reconciliation between 'Being' and 'Non-Being', 'Thesis' and 'Anti-Thesis'. But Hegel's argument is that both 'Being' and 'Non-Being', 'Thesis' and 'Anti-thesis' get accommodated or reconciled in 'Becoming' or 'Synthesis'. If contradictories are mutually exclusive then 'Being' and 'Non-Being', 'Thesis' and 'Anti-Thesis' cannot be reconciled at all. This shows that Hegel does not use 'contradiction' and 'negation' in the sense of absolute mutual negation. What about the third member of the triad? Is it really a kind of reconciliation, a compromise between thesis and anti-thesis, between Being and Non-Being?

Hegel's answer is that it is a step towards reconciliation but not the final stage of reconciliation. In fact, it is not an absolutely reconciled stable position. Every reconciliation is a progressive stage in the direction but final reconciliation is reached only when the Absolute Spirit realizes itself. When such a stage is reached virtually there seems to be no difference between the initial and the so-called final stage.

In certain cases, the second member of the triad is the obvious contrary of the first; as for instance, Being and Nothing; Essence and Appearance. In certain cases, the third member is an obvious choice that mediates between the other two. As for example, the mediation of spirit between the Logical Idea and Nature or the mediation of Measure between Quality and Quantity are such instance. Still in certain other cases, the third member is not at all obvious. It is argued by Hegel that Teleology reconciles the Mechanical and the Chemical, Unhappy Other Worldliness emerges out of Stoicism and Scepticism. In such cases, the emergence of the third member is not at all obvious and so the entire process seems to be purely arbitrary, artificial and mechanical.

In certain cases, a term, for example, 'child' may involve incompleteness of which the next term 'adult' furnishes the required complement. Findlay distinguishes the Dialectical necessity from mathematical necessity and likens it with necessity and inevitability that obtains in art and literature. Hegel's Dialectical triad reveals a community of style. This means that at any point of development only certain continuations would be natural. Hegel argues that stoic indifference leads to sceptical consciousness of medieval Catholicism. Findlay argues:

To look for absolute rigour in the Dialectic is to ignore

the illumination it has for the sake of some quasi-mathematical interconnection which it does not and cannot possess?

Hegel falls back on experience in support of his Dialectic: This shows that Dialectic is not devoid of all sorts of experience. Findlay argues:

The precise content, even the firm of the Dialectic largely depends on the material, drawn from common experience, history, biography, literature and natural science, which it enables us to organize, and from which it cannot well be separated. In casting about for something that will serve as an opposite, a complement or a reconciling unity of certain phases, Hegel has constant recourse to nature and history: he introduces forms that would never have been arrived at through the abstract development of concepts. In his power to introduce such forms and to illuminate them surprisingly by philosophical concepts, that Hegel's unique genius consists. No other philosopher has shown a like blend of factual knowledge and conceptual skill⁸.

Thus, whether in *Phenomenology*, *Philosophy of Nature* or in theodicistic philosophy of history, Hegel does not try either to modify or demonstrate the results of these branches of knowledge; he puts them into, what is known as satisfactory conceptual frame. Hegel has shown the primacy of self-conscious Spirit in individual culture and experience, in the abstract medium of concepts and in the concrete medium of nature and social mind. The lower categories and forms of

thought breakdown because they are inadequate approximations to the self-differentiating unity which is the self-conscious spirit.

It is universally held that Hegel treats 'contradiction' as basic or primary not to thought and language but also to the world. Contradiction is the moving force of the universe as a whole. Hegel has been severely criticized on this. If contradiction is taken in the sense of a self-nullifying utterance and statement then the Hegelian thesis is not acceptable at all. A self-contradictory expression does not say anything at all. On the other hand, Hegel's argument is that not only that contradiction is the moving force of the world but all contradictions are preserved in the self-conscious spirit. How do we go about it? One way is just to reject Hegel's notion of contradiction and along with it the Hegelian Philosophy. The otherway is to sympathetically understand the Hegelian concept of contradiction. We are inclined to agree with P.F. Strawson that every great philosopher has to be understood in contemporary idiom. Strawson seeks to understand classical philosophers like Descartes, Kant and others in contemporary idioms; we must as far as possible, try to understand Hegel in contemporary idioms too. Wholesale rejection of Hegel's views on contradiction may not be fair at all. It is necessary to quote a passage from J.N. Findlay:

We may, however, maintain that, whatever Hegel may say in regard to the presence of contradictions as thought and reality, the sense in which he admits such contradictions is determined by his use of the concepts, and not by what he says about it⁹.

Hegel does not use contradiction in the self-cancelling

sense. He uses it in the sense of opposed, antithetical tendencies which work in contrary directions when Understanding takes over contradictions get rigid and stiff and they are subsequently sublated in a synthesis. But this is not to say that ordinary ways of speaking is infested with contradiction. Hegel is not a philosophical anarchist ready to hurl Dialectical bombs on ordinary way of speaking. Further, contradictions do not appear when one is involved in one level of discourse. But as soon as one engages in what is known as multi-level discourse, contradictions appear to be there. When one thinks deep about the nature of concepts, contradictions and 'breakdowns' appear to be there. Contradictions appear when one seeks to have a holistic look at the world. Findlay argues:

Whatever one may think of the detailed application of his Dialectic, he has certainly made plain that our notions do carry with them a certain natural shading into other notions, a natural implication of such notions, and a natural favourableness and unfavourableness to other notions, which it is not in our power to create or alter but which may be said to rest solely on their affinity of content. And with this affinity of content goes a natural tendency of our notions to slide over into other notions, to alter and develop in certain ways (many of them contrary), which tendency again we can neither make nor unmake, but can only yield to, or suppress¹⁶.

Concepts have not only a 'logical geography' but also a 'logical dynamic'. Concepts grow and grow in dialectical fashion. It may be stated here that Hegel anticipated many of the views that are associated with Wittgenstein in the present

century. Wittgenstein traces the sources of all philosophical problems to language. In fact, according to him, philosophical problems are purely linguistic in nature. But they have to be distinguished from ordinary grammatical or philological problems; they are not problems relating to phonetics, semantics or syntax. Wittgenstein makes a distinction between ordinary grammar and philosophical grammar. If at all philosophical problems are grammatical, the grammar that characterizes them is of a different type; it is philosophical grammar. Wittgenstein recognizes the fact that a philosopher suffers from a kind of 'mental cramp' while reflecting on the nature of language. Even reflection on ordinary language leads to it. When we fix our attention on aspect of certain expressions and absolutize them we are likely to end up in a kind of absurd metaphysics. Sometimes we tend to ignore the differences and concentrate on unity and at certain other time, we ignore unity and concentrate on difference and accordingly devise philosophical notations. These are symptomatic of deep disquietude. Sometimes we are also lured away by false ideal of philosophical exactness. Wittgenstein argues that philosophical confusions emerge when language goes on holiday¹¹ and these confusions disappear when we show the fly the way out of the fly bottle¹². That is to say that complete liquidation or abandonment of such confusions is the main objective of philosophy. But for Hegel, such confusions, contradictions and negations need not be demolished at all. As a matter of fact, they are all preserved and enriched in the spirit. Wittgenstein feels comfortable when confusions are eliminated but Hegel feels comfortable when they are recognized as integral part and parcel of Reality. Wittgenstein did not create any metaphysics out of ordinary language and discourse but Hegel created a metaphysics out of it. It is this

all confusions, contradictions and negations not only merge but are reconcile in the spirit. The Hegelian Spirit may be interpreted as the ultimate and basic speech form. It is comparable to the OM in the Indian philosophical tradition. As the OM contains in implicit form everything including all the speech forms so is the case with the Hegelian spirit. This is how, we wish to suggest that Hegel was doing a kind of revisionary metaphysics of language and speech.

But at the same time, the Hegelian Dialectic is not free from criticism. Hegel presumed that there is a kind of deductive necessity with Dialectic. But as we have argued out earlier, the presumed necessity is absent in the Dialectic. The conclusions do not follow from the basic postulates in accordance with certain rules of deduction. Such a deductive process does not obtain at all in respect of Hegelian Dialectic. Now the question is how to characterize it? In answer to this question it can be said that though the basic or fundamental category for Hegel is Spirit yet the world of things and beings do not follow from it in the manner of mathematical necessity. Science, morality, religion and etc. do not follow from the spirit in the similar manner. All these form a cluster round the spirit. Hegel proposes to look at the world with the help of the basic category. The philosophical illumination that Hegel wants to give cannot be equated with a piece of scientific information.

References

1. Findlay, J.N. *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, p. 60.
2. *Hegel's Science of Logic*, Trans. A.V. Miller, London, 1969, Vol. I, pp. 207-208.

3. Findlay, J.N. Hegel: A Re-Examination, pp. 62-63.
4. Hegel's Science of Logic, Vol. I, trans. A.V. Miller, p. 108.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.
6. Findlay, J.N. Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 68.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
11. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, Sect. 38.
12. *Ibid.*, Sect. 209.

VI

Conclusion

To write the concluding chapter in a Ph.D. dissertation is not really to offer any conclusive finding for the simple reason that there cannot be any conclusion in the sense of final truth in philosophy in general and on Hegel in particular. I do not lay claim to anything even bordering on finality on a topic like Hegel. My conclusions in the sense of small interpretation are tentative, provisional and subject to change in due course of time.

Hegel makes use of a plethora of expressions, concepts and categories which need explication and explanation: Perhaps no philosopher in history of European philosophy has used so much ordinary expressions in such a highly specialized and technical sense as has been done by Hegel. Expressions have been given technical meanings for philosophical purposes. Sometimes, it becomes very difficult to know what exactly the philosopher seeks to convey. Therefore, there is a need to present, what could be termed as Hegelian Philosophical lexicography.

The most used and off-quoted expression is 'Spirit'. In a sense, this constitutes the core of Hegelian lexicography. An attempt has been made in course of the chapters to explicate

the philosophical import of this expression. The German word 'Geist' has been translated into English as 'Spirit'. The English word 'spirit' is usually taken to stand for an invisible eternal object like soul, ghost, or even God. But Hegel does not use the word 'spirit' in this sense. In fact, the expression 'spirit' has not been used in the sense of any object or entity at all.

Some Hegel scholars have used 'Spirit' in the sense of universal consciousness, universal mind or even in the sense of a kind of common mind or super-personal mind. But Hegel does not use 'Spirit' in any one of these senses either. For Hegel, 'Spirit' stands for an all comprehensive, all inclusive, regulative and binding principle of thought, knowledge and reality having ethical and religious overtones. It includes Nature, the necessary, the contingent, and the rational, the irrational. Findlay argues:

We meet with a self-consciousness which is dispersed among a number of distinct centres, in all of which it recognizes itself, 'an I which is a We, a We which is an I'. Hegel makes it plain beyond question that self-consciousness Spirit only knows itself for what it is, when it thus rises superior to the distinction of person¹.

In this sense only it is the highest Idea or the Absolute. Its nature may either be implicit or explicit. Robert C. Solomon argues:

Geist is a convenient way of talking about the common properties of a society, of a people, or of all people while ignoring, but not denying, their differences. This sympathetic account of Geist eliminated the absurdity of talking about some actual mind common to all

people. Geist is universal in that it is the name of those properties had by every human consciousness: it is not universal in the sense that it is the name of a single entity (mind) common to every individual... Similarly, we may sympathetically interpret Hegel's Geist as an abstraction ranging over all human beings, an attempt to talk about humanity as a whole without being concerned with particular individuals, an attempt to talk about human consciousness without being concerned with the minds of any particular individuals².

Growth, evolution and dynamism characterise the concept of Spirit. That is to say, Spirit is not static; it grows and evolves. But it does not keep on growing and evolving forever for all times to come. There is a point up to which it grows and this is the point of self-realization, a kind of self-fulfilment and self-unfoldment. There is a well track which the Spirit traverses. A deistic and creator concept of God is absent in Hegel. On the contrary, Hegel advocates, what is known as an immanent view of God. The Absolute, the highest Idea or the Spirit is also God for Hegel and it is immanent in the world. Further, Hegel seeks to reconcile all contradictions, conflicts, disharmonies, chaos and confusions in the Spirit. Not only ethical and religious conflicts but epistemological and metaphysical disharmonies also are sought to be reconciled in the Spirit. Some scholars discover an affinity between the Hegelian Spirit and Kant's transcendental ego. But the Kantian transcendental ego is not as rich and as concrete as the Hegelian Spirit.

Hegel is an idealist; an objective idealist. That is to say, according to Hegel, all concepts, categories and thoughts are

interrelated. The world at large is a highly interrelated and integrated system. Therefore, atomism of any type is repugnant to Hegel. If Hegelian Absolute is spiritual it is spiritual in a highly technical sense. It is not spiritual in an esoteric or mystical sense; it is spiritual in a holistic and totalistic sense. For Wittgenstein, the totality of language games and forms of life (both, existent, possible discarded, old and new) constitutes language. For Hegel, no form of life, no form of language game is excluded from the domain of the Spirit. The only difference between Hegel and Wittgenstein is that for the former there is a centre and there is a periphery but for Wittgenstein, there is neither a centre nor a periphery. But as we have argued out earlier, the Hegelian Spirit does not stand either for an object or an entity; it is a name for the totality of what there is. Wittgenstein does not give any name to the totality of language game. But Hegel has a name for the totality as Spirit, Absolute, Reality and the highest Idea.

Being, Non-being, Nothing, Becoming, Thesis, Anti-thesis, and Synthesis are another set of concepts which have not only been associated with Hegel but they have played a very important role in shaping and moulding the course of European philosophy for ages. What are these concepts? What do they stand for? Are there Being, Non-Being, Thesis, Anti-thesis and such others like tables, chairs, books and men? We have argued out in the preceding chapters that these categories and concepts are meta-linguistic in nature. That is to say, these concepts are not about things or objects but are about other concepts and categories. It is not the case that there are Beings, Non-Beings and Becoming. Being or Thesis can be discovered in any concept. When we strip it off all the universals it is the Being or Thesis. What remains of a thing that is bereft of all the universals? The answer is: it is the same thing as Nothing

or Non-Being. So, in the process, Becoming or Synthesis comes into existence. It appears that Hegel is engaged in a kind of verbal magic. That is to say, even if there is no genuine distinction between Being, Non-Being and Becoming, Hegel creates one. As Being is bereft of all universals so is the case with both Non-Being and Becoming. What reply could be given on behalf of Hegel? Is not Hegel playing with words? In answer to these questions it can be said that it would be unfair to say that Hegel was just playing with words and was not doing serious philosophy. It is very important to note that Hegel recognizes Being or Thesis as the first category. Why? What could be the answer? In answer to this question it can be said that objects of knowledge are always positive; they are a cluster of universals. But when we separate these universals one by one at least in thought we come across the Being or the Thesis. But the Being is as good as Non-Being. This kind of conceptual interchange between Being and Non-Being prompts Hegel to posit Becoming as a separate kind of category. Being, Non-Being and Becoming are not empirical facts about the world; they represent a philosophical model to explain growth and evolution of thought, knowledge and concepts. In this sense only there cannot be what is known as absolute negation and absolute contradiction in the sphere of thought and knowledge. The so-called negation or contradiction is really a kind of tension and conflict which leads to further growth and evolution. Hegel extends this kind of model to science, society, politics, morality, religion and the world at large. But the so-called tension and conflict do not give rise to chaos and confusion; it gives rise to reconciliation and this in turn gives rise to tension and conflict ultimately leading to further synthesis. The Being or Thesis, i.e., the first category of thought and reality contains in implicit

form the highest synthesis and the highest synthesis is the explicit form of the Being. The first category is the same as the last category and *vice versa*. In other words, the first is the same as the last and the last is the same as the first. But then the question is why then this metaphysical drama? Hegel's answer is that if the world is the totality then nothing can fall outside it including chaos, confusion and unrest and the totality can be viewed from various standpoints. Hegel takes care of both the standpoints. This type of metaphysics is not unknown to Indian philosophical tradition. In Samkhya tradition, Prakrit in Pralaya stage (involution) is comparable to the implicit form of the Hegelian Absolute and in the fully evolved stage Prakrit is comparable to explicit form of the Absolute.

Another very important concept that is used by Hegel is 'Notion'. The original German word for 'Notion' is 'Begriff'. But Hegel does not use it in one definite sense. He uses it in a variety of ways. He argues:

But in this connection we can be reminded that there is a multitude of Notions, a multitude of objects (Sache). We have, however, already said how it is that restrictions are imposed on the multitude, that the Notion, simply as thought, as a Universal, is the immeasurable abbreviation of the multitudes of particular things which are vaguely present to intuition and pictorial thought; but also a Notion is, first, in its own self the Notion, and this is only one and is the substantial foundation; secondly, a Notion is determinate and it is this determinateness in it which appears as content; but the determinateness of the Notion is a specific form of this substantial oneness, a

moment of the form as totality, of that same Notion which is the foundation of the specific Notions.

This Notion is not sensuously intuited or represented; it is solely an object, a product and content of thinking, and is the absolute, self-subsistent object (Sache), the logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of what we call things; it is at least of all the logos which should be left outside the science of logic³.

‘Notion’ like Being is an all-inclusive and all-comprehensive concept. Notion is both subjective and objective. Hegel argues:

The pure Notion is the absolutely infinite, unconditioned and free..... Thus, the Notion is, in the first instance, the absolute self-identity that is such only as the negation of negation or as the infinite unity of the negativity with itself⁴.

The Hegelian Notion in this respect, resembles the Brahman of Samkara which is also regarded as infinite and unconditioned. It is difficult to say at this point if Hegel was influenced by Samkara but there is no doubt that there is a conceptual affinity between Samkara and Hegel on this point. The following passage quoted from Science of Logic brings Hegel very close to Samkara. Hegel argues:

The universal is therefore free power, it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but without doing violence to it; on the contrary, the universal is, in its other, in peaceful communion with itself. We have called it free power, but it could also be called free love and boundless blessedness, for it bears itself towards its other as towards its own self; in it it has returned to itself⁵.

Advait Vedant characterises Brahman, the ultimate reality by Sat (truth), Chit (consciousness) and Ananda (pure joy). But at the same time, Samkara's Brahman cannot be said to contain the world which is regarded as Maya or illusory but the Hegelian Notion not only contains the Universal but also the particular, the necessary and the contingent. In this sense, the Hegelian Notion is a concrete individual whereas the Brahman of Samkara cannot be regarded as a concrete individual at all. The Hegelian Notion contains both Jiva (the individual person) and the Atman (the universal person) but Samkara's Brahman is the same as Atman.

The Hegelian Notion is also used in the sense of pure self-consciousness. Hegel, like Kant, identifies the self with the unifying and universalizing agency of thought. Findlay, the famous Hegel scholar argues:

The Hegelian Notion is, in fact, an entity straddling several spheres, that can be approached from several directions. It is an element in the individual's experience, and can as such be approached by way of feeling, sense-awareness and imagery as Hegel will do in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. It can be approached in terms of an ideal spiritual education as was done in the *Phenomenology*. But its logical aspects are concerned solely with the self-revelation of objects, in terms of various universals without regard to the pictorial ways in which such a revelation may be brought home to the individual, and in this direction the notion has its ancestry in the abstract concepts of Being and Essence, of whose notional character it represents the explicit statement. But the Notion also has a footing in the realm of Nature in which, says

Hegel, it appears as a 'blind, unspirited Notion, one that neither apprehends nor thinks itself'; such a Notion is only a Notion implicitly or by courtesy. Hegel's Notions have in fact, much the same variety of role as the Forms of things have in Aristotle; they have a being in nature, whose variety and changes they produce and explain, they also have an immaterial being in the mind in which role they are led up to by various psychic states and accompaniments. But the Notion as such resembles Aristotle's Intelligence in Act or the self-thinking thought of God, which in thinking itself also thinks every determinate notions⁶.

Thus, seen in this light, it can be said that the Hegelian Notion is both a universal, a particular and above all, a concrete individual. It is all comprehensive and all-inclusive in this sense. Nothing falls outside the domain of the Notion. It is complete; nay self-complete; the *Purnam* (Absolutely rich and self-complete) of the *Upanishadas*.

Another concept which is frequently used by Hegel is 'Idea'. In the preceding chapter, we have discussed what an idea is and what are the sense in which 'idea' has been used in philosophical literature. But at this stage it is imperative to explain in detail what does Hegel mean by the 'Idea'. 'Being', 'Notion' and 'Idea' seem to have been used interchangeably by Hegel. Are they three different concepts or they are various names for the same concept? We wish to discuss such issues in the chapter. One such concept is Idea. The German word *Idee* has been translated into English as Idea. 'Idea' has not been used by Hegel either in the sense of image or mental picture as Locke and some other empiricists have done it. Further, he also does not use 'Idea' in the sense in which Plato

and Aristotle used it. For Plato and Aristotle, ideas are forms or archetypes. Accordingly, there are innumerable ideas or forms. But unlike the Lockean ideas, Platonic ideas are real, objective and eternal. Hegel comes closer to Plato by treating Idea as objective and real. But the Hegelian Idea is more than being objective. It is dynamic and concrete, whereas the Platonic ideas are not so.

Idea is conceived by Hegel as the basis or foundation of the entire universe. But it is not either the underlying substance or the cause of it; it is an End towards which the world is said to be tending. But at the same time, the End is not something which is imposed on the world or external to it. The Means-End relation in this context is not external but internal.

Hegel tells us that his use of the term 'Idea' is derived from Kant. For Kant, the transcendental Ideas of God, the soul and the World are the last products of Reason. But Kant's 'Idea' was influenced by the Platonic idea, consequently, the Hegelian Idea has its roots in Plato. Plato argues that the highest good is the principle of Unity and all other ideas could be explained in terms of it. Hegel agrees with Kant that Ideas have something to do with Reason only. But according to Kant, Ideas are regulative; they guide our thought and set limit to it. The Idea, according to Hegel, is not far from objects of experience. Things of experience can be said to fall short of truth but the Idea is truly real. This is the difference between the Kantian and the Hegelian Idea. In Idea, the Notion achieves freedom through a process of opposition. Idea is the categorial form of self-consciousness, it is the last truth. In this connection, it is necessary to delineate Hegel's views on knowledge. According to Hegel, knowledge is not a product but a process. It is a long process of conflict resolution. Knowledge is dynamic and it grows. It is a series of conflict

resolution. Only when all the contradictions are resolved, the Idea comes to a rest; Findlay argues:

Hegel conceives of knowledge as an understanding, a process of inquiry, rather than as a product or result of such inquiry. It is always a resolution of a 'contradiction', the contradiction between the absolute self-certainty of the thinking self, which feels all reality to lie within its explanatory grasp and its humbling confrontation with what is merely given with what seems to come from without, for whose precise form and occasion of irruption no reason can be given. All experience thwarts the unbounded ego-centricity and self-sovereignty of the thinker and the thinker can accordingly not rest till he has subdued and mastered the alien and intrusive element.

By treating knowledge as a dynamic process, Hegel anticipates Karl Popper and such other philosophers in the 20th century who argue that knowledge grows and develops.

Hegel makes use of such expressions as potential, actual, being- in itself, and being—for itself. Such expressions stand in need of clarification 'potential', 'actual', 'implicit' and 'explicit' have not only been used in European philosophical tradition but they also have been used in some Indian philosophical systems. The Samkhya system of Indian philosophy makes use of the concepts of potential and actual. Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher also made profuse use of such terms.

Hegel makes free use of such concepts. Being-in itself is the same as the Being in implicit form and the Being for itself is the same as the Being in its explicit form. Hegel even goes

to the extent of saying that the Actual is Real and Real is Actual. The potential is the same, "in itself", implicit and latent. The actual is known as "for itself" explicit and manifested. Development does not involve the arising of something totally new. For Hegel, it is the transition from potential being to actual being. The analogy of oak and acorn is given by Hegel to explain his position. The acorn is the oak in implicit or potential form. It is "in itself". The oak is the explicit form of the acorn. The oak is "for itself". We wish to point out that the views that the oak is already there in the acorn in implicit form and the oak is the explicit form of the acorn are not to be decided on scientific investigations. In fact, it is not a scientific piece of information that the oak is in the acorn or the acorn is the oak. These are metaphysical theories or viewpoints which cannot be proved or disproved on scientific investigations. It is a kind of conceptual revision and conceptual revisions are made for various reasons and purposes. Hegel, as a revisionary metaphysician tries to revise our concepts relating to origin, growth and development of objects and things.

Hegel makes a queer distinction between subjective spirit, Nature and Second Nature. When spirit separates itself from itself, Nature comes into existence. Further, the subjective spirit also goes to create a second Nature i.e., the State. What Hegel wants to say is this: Not only Nature but all natural objects, state, government, religion and morality are integral part and parcel of the Spirit. In other words, whatever is there both in Nature and Society is nothing but Spirit. In the level of society; spirit culminates in State. It is the actual God upon the Earth. Apart from providing for satisfaction of vegetative needs of individuals the State also provides for satisfaction of their deeper needs. Aesthetics, Religion and Philosophy satisfy these

needs. Beauty, Worship and Speculation are the three objectives or ideals. Sensuous needs are satisfied in art, emotional needs in religion and speculative need is satisfied in philosophizing. We wish to point out in this connection that Hegel's overriding wish to explain everything in terms of one basic principle that is the Absolute Spirit compels him even to twist everything that a State has to fit into the explanatory model. Man has created not only art, religion and philosophy but also science, technology and so many other things. Where does Hegel put them? If Philosophy is said to satisfy what is known as the speculative need, what does science satisfy? What about engineering, medicine, law, architecture and so on? Can Hegel explain the creations of man in a straight-jacket model? It seems that Hegel has no answer to these questions.

Hegel makes a distinction between Spirit of Nations and the World-Spirit. The Spirit of Nations express itself in national art, culture, customs and traditions and to that extent they are limited. But the World-Spirit transcends and goes beyond the national boundaries. It creates something which is impersonal, objective and transcends all state and national boundaries. This shows, that Hegel did not have any preference for any type of narrow parochialism. But soon he reverts back to Germany and the Germanic nation. Hegel argues that the German Romantic age was the period where the World-Spirit manifested itself in explicit form. Racial and cultural pride of Hegel finds its echo in this respect Hegel is an instance whereas ideology is inextricably mixed with philosophy. Seen in this light, it can be said that the art of philosophizing is not always value-neutral. In his philosophy of state, Hegel asserts the Germanic pride and Germanic superiority.

Hegel's Philosophy of art deserves special and careful

attention. We have not discussed Hegel's views on art because of paucity of space. What we have tried to show is how Hegel's metaphysics and philosophy of art are highly integrated and interlinked.

In Religion, according to Hegel, the Idea reveals itself. The God of religion when stripped of all pictorial adjuncts is the same as the 'I' of self-consciousness. This is a very significant remark. In this respect, Hegel comes very close to the Advait tradition of Vedant. Brahman is the same as the Atman. It is the centre of all consciousness. God is said to be God only insofar as He knows Himself. Self-knowledge is the same as self-consciousness. That is to say, God's self-knowledge is part of man's self-consciousness and *vice versa*. What Hegel is trying to say is that at the stage of self-consciousness, God and Man converge.

Hegel takes into account the historical development of religions. The magical form of the primitive stage of religion grows into a kind of pantheistic religion and ultimately it develops into what is known as the revealed religion. Hegel argues that Christianity is the highest stage of religious evolution. We wish to point out that Hegel seeks to reinterpret religion and religious evolution in accordance with his dialectical model. Further, when Hegel was writing, anthropological and philosophical studies of religion were not done extensively. He was not aware of the complexities of the so-called Asiatic and African religions. This may be one of the reasons why Hegel glorified one religion in lieu of others.

Philosophy for Hegel, is history of philosophy. Hegel argues that the last philosophy of an epoch necessarily sums up all previous stages of philosophy and is the highest phase, so far, in the self-consciousness of Spirit. Though Hegel treats Christianity as the final stage of religion, yet he does not

treat his philosophy as the final stage of philosophical development. He argues that individual philosophers are the blind men whom the inner spirit drives and it gives rise to philosophy. This shows that Hegel was not at all obscurantist in this regard.

We are inclined to agree with Hegel that philosophy is a kind of intellectual history. It is not the case that a philosophical system grows in a vacuum. In a very important sense, not only philosophy but all intellectual disciplines grow in opposition to and in sharp criticism of existing theories and views. But it is not correct to say that intellectual growth follows strictly a dialectical path.

Hegel anticipates some of the contemporary views on sense perception and certainty. Russell and some other philosophers make a distinction between "Knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description". "Knowledge by acquaintance" is that knowledge where we are simply acquainted with the object of knowledge. This is a kind of knowledge where there is just a sense contact with the object. This kind of knowledge is bereft of all types of description. "Knowledge by description" is knowledge through description of properties and qualities. "Knowledge by acquaintance" is knowledge of the 'given'.

Philosophy has been defined variously from time to time. Sometimes it has been defined as a kind of super science. That is to say, Philosophy is a discipline which gives knowledge of the supersensible. In this sense, philosophy is said to present the absolute and perfect picture of the world. In another sense, philosophy is said to be a kind of ontology. It describes the nature of the being qua being. Still in another sense, philosophy is said to be neither a kind of ontology nor dealing with the supersensible but a kind of conceptual analysis concerned with

analysis of concepts and categories in terms of which we think about the world. But Findlay argues:

Strange as it may seem, Hegel's philosophy does much to satisfy all those conceptions of philosophy: it is unsatisfactory to any of them because it does so much justice to them all. While it analyses ordinary concepts and ways of speech, and leaves them undisturbed at their level, it also subjects them to devastating higher level criticism. While it allows us to think in alternative ways, and grants each a limited character of legitimacy. It also ranges them in a hierarchical order of adequacy, at the summit of which there is only one completely satisfactory mode of conception, the Absolute Idea. If it permits itself much piecemeal treatment of separate issues, it also gathers these treatments together in a concerted attack on the Absolute⁷.

We are inclined to agree with Findlay's argument with the following remark:

Hegel has given insights on various themes and this is true of all great classical thinkers. Findlay characterises Hegel as anti-metaphysical philosopher. This observation is very illuminating. Traditionally speaking, Hegel has been regarded as a metaphysician engaged in discovering and unravelling that which remains hidden beyond any kind of sense perception. But as a matter of fact, according to Hegel, God and Absolute are not entities existing beyond the pale of human experience. God and Absolute are known to man in some kind of experience. Hegel does not talk of any mystical experience which is accessible only to

a limited and chosen few. Further, Hegel does not denounce the methods of natural sciences and mathematics as defective. He does not argue that things of the world are illusory and are the creations of human consciousness. Findlay argues:

For Hegel, there can be no absolute, infinite experience which is not also, from another point of view, limited and personal, nor can the Whole appear otherwise than in the perspective of an individual consciousness, stamped with the ineffaceable mark of the Here and the Now⁸.

Hegel is compared with Aristotle for the former's keen interest in things of experience and nature. It is imperative to quote Findlay's argument in this connection.

No philosopher, except possibly Aristotle, has produced thought with a trifle of Hegel's empirical richness. That it is a merit to be thus rich and concrete need not be argued: most modern philosophizing seems watery by comparison. And not only are Hegel's notions empirical: his system may be said to operate with certain high-level hypotheses which, though may not admitting of empirical verification or falsification, nonetheless stand in many logical relations to propositions which are thus verifiable or falsifiable⁹.

Hegel is neither anti-science nor anti-common sense. He does not argue that philosophical knowledge supersedes both science and common sense. Rather, as we have argued out earlier, Hegel advocates a kind of teleological idealism. In this sense, Hegelian idealism is different from that of Plato, Berkeley and Kant. Plato denounce the world of sense

experience as illusory, short living and transitory. Berkeley advocated a kind of subjective idealism or solipsism. Similarly, Kant advocates a kind of transcendental idealism. That is to say, according to Kant, the world of noumenon is unknown and unknowable, it falls beyond the ken of experience. It is quite likely that teleological idealism of Hegel might give a new direction to scientific attitude in research. Hegel's idealism may be interpreted as expressing a deep faith in scientific and artistic act of mankind. It aims at making explicit and intelligible what otherwise remains obscure and unclear. The Hegelian dictum that real is rational and rational is real is a significant pointer in this regard. That what is real must be intelligible and amenable to reason.

Some critics have characterized the Hegelian dialectic as the chief source of both merits and demerits. It tells us that there can be such thing as the absolute truth or absolute truth in a given mode of speech and thought. We can simply say that our mode of thought and speech may be better and more adequate than the other. In fact, one category passes over to another. Findlay argues:

While we can cut off their corners, and give them an artificial fixity, they have, in their natural, living state, a perpetual tendency to pass over into other ideas, and sometimes several inconsistent directions of development which well-chosen questions may bring to light¹⁰.

However, dialectic also is the source of all demerits in Hegel's system. Hegel believe as if dialectic is the law of the world and it follows a definite and preordained path. We wish to point out that this aspect of Hegel's Philosophy is not

acceptable. The triplicity or triadicity of Hegelian Dialectic does not reveal but marks the genuine nature of his thought. The movement of thought from thesis to synthesis via antithesis as envisaged by Hegel appears, mechanical and twisted. In this sense only, the Dialectic marks the Hegelian thought. But the most significant insight of Hegelian Dialectic is that the categories of thought and speech are basically unstable; they pass on into one another. Findlay rightly characterized Hegel as the Aristotle of post—Renaissance world. Hegel tried to knit together the varieties of experience into a single whole; he never thought it necessary to introduce the category of the transcendent. This is the merit of Hegelian philosophy. Findlay argues that the official defenders of Christianity have borrowed their logic from Aristotle but Hegel is the only philosopher who has borrowed the whole cast of his philosophy from Christianity. Perhaps the reasons for treating Hegel as a Christian philosopher is that teleology or immanent purpose characterizes Hegelian Philosophy. Hegel has also been regarded as the philosopher of absolute negativity in that he does not believe in anything that does not spring from free, uncommitted, self-committing human spirit. Findlay regards Hegel as a humanist. He argues:

Despite his later verging towards reaction, he remains the philosopher of Reformation, 'inwardness', of liberal humanism, of perpetual, orderly revolution¹¹.

In the contemporary period, Hegel scholars and critics have tried to discover conceptual affinity between Hegel and Wittgenstein. The comparison may sound anachronistic. How is it that Hegel could be said to anticipate Wittgenstein? What is so common between the two? The positivists denounced

Hegelian metaphysics as non-sense and meaningless. On the other hand, they (the positivists) were inspired by the early Wittgenstein. Further, the later Wittgenstein is said to be the champion of linguistic or conceptual analysis, whereas Hegel is said to be the champion of idealistic metaphysics. So, how to reconcile with the view that there is a great deal common between the two thinkers?

In answer to these questions it may be said that philosophy unlike other empirical disciplines like sciences and history is an interpretative discipline. There is a sense in which Galileo and even Newton may have been refuted by subsequent scientists but there is no such refutation in history of philosophy. In other words, history of science is full of refutation but such refutations are absent in history of philosophy. This is why history of philosophy is highly relevant to philosophy but history of science does not seem to have any relevance to subsequent theory building. In short, history of science is not part of science but part of history. On the contrary, history of philosophy is an integral part of philosophy. In this sense only, Plato and Aristotle, Samkara and Ramanuja and Hegel have to be interpreted from time to time. The contemporary idioms, concepts and categories provide the base for the purpose. The later philosophy of Wittgenstein has provided the paradigm for philosophizing in the Anglo-American world in the contemporary period. So, it is not out of the way if attempt is made by the scholars to discover conceptual affinity between Hegel and Wittgenstein.

Linguistic and conceptual analysis characterizes later philosophy of Wittgenstein. Can we say that Hegel was also doing, among other things, a kind of linguistic and conceptual analysis? Terry Pinkard and Robert C. Solomon argue that

Hegel anticipated Wittgenstein. There is a great deal of conceptual affinity between the two. Robert C. Solomon in an article "Hegel's Epistemology" (included in *Hegel*: Ed. Michael Inwood. Oxford University Press, 1985) argues that Hegelian epistemological analysis comes very close to Wittgenstein's views on knowledge and certainty. Both empiricism, romanticism, intuitionism and mysticism uphold the view that knowledge begin with the 'given' the bare particular. We have argued out earlier that Russell also argues almost in the similar vein by making a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance knowledge by description. Knowledge by description presupposes and depends upon what is known as knowledge by acquaintance. Though Hegel does not deny the sensuous component in empirical knowledge yet he does not accept the view that knowledge by acquaintance precedes knowledge by description. According to Hegel, knowledge is a kind of description: without description, without application of universals there is no knowledge at all. In this respect only Hegel can be said to have anticipated Wittgenstein. According to Wittgenstein, all seeing is "seeing as". This means that no knowledge, no perception, no seeing can be termed as knowledge or perception of the bare particular.

Terry Pinkard in an article "The Logic of Hegel's Logic" (included in *Hegel*, (ed.) Michael Inwood, Oxford University Press, 1985) argues that according to Hegel, the forms of thought are set out and deposited in human language. That is to say, the meaning of concepts are inherent in the language game. The Hegelian view of concepts and language, in this sense it is similar to that of Wittgenstein.

Peter Hylton in an essay entitled "Hegel and Analytic Philosophy" included in (*Cambridge Companion to Hegel*

(Ed.) Federick C. Beiser, Cambridge University Press, 1993) argues that Russell and Moore were influenced by Hegel's interpretation of Kant. It is said that during their student days both Russell and Moore were influenced by British Hegelians like T.H. Green, McTaggart, Bosanquet, F.H. Bradley and some others. But in due course of time, they got disenchanted with idealism and began to react sharply against it. Hylton argues that the reaction was not only set against Hegel but against Kant as well and Russell and Moore were very much influenced by Hegel's criticism of Kant. In short, Hegel's criticism of Kant's 'unknown' and 'unknowable' inspired Russell and Moore to join issue on the matter. In this sense only, indirectly Hegel is responsible for the analytical movement in philosophy. We wish to point out that Hegel's is really a mine of philosophical wealth and as such it has not only given rise to left-wing Hegelians and right-wing Hegelians but has also inspired the so-called un-Hegelians or anti-Hegelians like Russell and Moore.

Hegel's Philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*) comes very close to Khasi Pnar's concept of nature. In my M.Phil. dissertation (*Khasi Pnar Concept of Nature* by Dharendra Ramsiej, submitted to North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, (1986), the Khasi version of which has already been published) I have argued that the Khasi believe in a kind of integrated and holistic view of nature where both living and non-living form inalienable parts. Nature, according to Hegel, is the Idea self-estranged. According to Hegel, God, the pure self-active Idea would be a mere abstraction and a wholly abstract God or Idea is a contradiction in terms. 'God' according to Hegel, has two revelations, as Nature and as Spirit. Both these divine formations are temples of God that He fills by his presence. God as an abstraction is not the true God, argues Hegel. The

holistic and organic view of nature and the universe upheld by Hegel resembles in many ways the Khasi view of it. It is strange but at the same time a fact that the most sophisticated and highly articulated philosophy of Hegel could bear resemblance to the least sophisticated and the least articulated views embedded in the oral traditions of tribal group like the Khasis. This similarity and resemblance in two traditions obtaining in thousand miles away from each other inspire me to undertake this humble task of investigation.

This dissertation consists of six chapters. The first chapter is entitled Introduction. The objective of the investigation has been stated in brief in the chapter. The second chapter entitled Thought and Idea is devoted to an analysis of thought and idea in general and those of Hegel in particular. The third chapter is entitled Thought and Mind. This chapter is devoted to an analysis of the interrelationship between thought and mind in the context of Hegel. The fourth chapter entitled Thought and the World is devoted to Hegel's views on Nature. In fact, the chapter is devoted to an examination of what is known as Hegel's *Naturphilosophie*. The fifth chapter is entitled Logic of Dialectic. It is devoted to explication and analysis of Hegel's views on Dialectic. The sixth chapter entitled Conclusion aims at stating my views (very humble) including my analysis of Hegel.

Hegel is one of those very few great philosophers that the world has ever produced. No philosopher has been so very much denounced and so greatly rated and respected as Hegel. Hegel has something very important and significant to say almost on every branch of philosophy be it Ontology, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Logic, Religion, Morals, Politics, History, Science, Literature, Art and Sculpture and so on. It is humanly impossible to write a Ph.D. dissertation including

all aspects of Hegelian philosophy. Therefore, I have chosen only a small and limited topic for my investigation but at the same time a theme which is crucial to understanding Hegel. One small example from Hegel's *Science of Logic* would be sufficient to prove how insightful his statement about mathematical education and in itself can be an independent topic of investigation. Hegel argues:

Calculation being so much an external and therefore mechanical business, it has been possible to construct machines which perform arithmetical operations with complete accuracy. A knowledge of just this one fact about the nature of calculation is sufficient for an appraisal of the idea of making calculation the principal means for educating the mind and stretching it on the rack in order to perfect it as a machine¹².

To conclude, it can be said that Hegel was not unaware of the second-order task of philosophy. His famous statement is worth noting in this context. "The Owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk¹³." Minerva is the Graeco-Roman Goddess of wisdom. It is a fact that owl the nocturnal bird comes out of its nest only after the Sun set. Owl is also the symbol of wisdom in the European tradition. It means that wisdom takes its flight only after the Sun set. In this connection, Hegel also argues: "When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old." Philosophy begins when the actuality is matured. That is to say, philosophy is not concerned with the empirical world the way in which scientists talk about it. Philosophy apprehends the real world in its 'substance' and builds it up into the shape of an 'intellectual realm'. In this sense, according to Hegel,

philosophy is a kind of intellectual or conceptual construction and he has been extremely successful in it. One may or may not agree with Hegel on all the points that he has made but the fact remains that he would continue to inspire philosophers for all times to come.

References

1. Findlay, J.N. Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 97.
2. Solomon, Robert C. Hegel to Existentialism, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 5.
3. Hegel's Science of Logic, Trans. A.V. Miller, p. 39.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 601.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 603.
6. Findlay, J.N. Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 224.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 347-348.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 350.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 354.
12. Hegel's Science of Logic, Vol. I, Translated by A.V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin, New York Humanities Press, 1969, pp. 216-217.
13. Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated with Notes, T.R. Knox Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, p. 13.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Bibliography

- Avineri, Shlomo. *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1972.
- Beiser, Fredrick C. (Ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993.
- Bhattacharyya, H.M. *The Principles of Philosophy*. University of Calcutta, 1969.
- Bubner, Rudiger (Ed.). *German Idealist Philosophy*. Penguin Books, London, 1997.
- Cohen Robert S. and Wartofasky Max W. *Hegel and the Sciences. Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science*, Dordrecht D. Reidel Publishing, Nijhoff, 1983.
- Commins, Saxe and Linscott, R.N. *The World's Great Thinkers. Man and the State: The Political Philosophers*. Random House, New York, 1947.
- Compleston, Fredrick S.J.A. *History of Philosophy*, Vol. VII, Burns and Oates Ltd., London, 1963.
- Cullen, Bernard (Ed.). *Hegel Today*. Gover Publishing Company Ltd., Anebury, England, 1988.
- Edwards, Paul (Ed.). *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vols. 3 & 4. Macmillan Inc., New York, 1972.
- Elder, Crawford. *Appropriating Hegel. Scots Philosophical Monographs Number Three*, Aberdeen University Press, Great Britian, 181.
- Findlay, J.N. *Hegel: A Re-Examination*. Humanities Press Inc., New York, 1958.
- Flay Joseph C. *Hegel's Quest for Certainty*. State University of New York Press, Albany, 1984.

- Friedrich, Carl J. (Ed.). *The Philosophy of Hegel*. The Modern Library, New York, 1954.
- Gadamer, Hans-George. *Hegel's Dialectic: Fine Hermeneutical Studies*. Translated with an Introduction by P. Christopher Smith, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1976.
- Hamlyne, D.W. *The Penguin History of Western Philosophy*. Penguin Books, London, 1990.
- Hegel, G.W.F. *Aesthetics, Lectures on Fine Art*. Translated by T.M. Knox, Vol. I. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Hegel: *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*. Translated by Bernard Bosanquet and Edited with an Introduction and Commentary by Michael Inwood, Penguin Books, London, 1993.
- Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1930)*. Translated from German by William Wallace, Oxford University Press, London, 1975.
- Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Translated from German by E.S. Haldane and Frances H.S. Simon. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1892.
- Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*. Translated from Nicolin and Poggeler' Edition (1959) and from the Zusätze in Michelet's Text (1847) by A.V. Miller with Foreword by J.N. Findlay. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970.
- Hegel's Philosophy on Subjective Spirit*. Edited and Translated with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes by M.J. Petry, Holland: D. Rudel, 1978.
- Hegel's Political Writings*. Translated from German by T.M. Knox with an Introductory Essay by Z.A. Pdezynski. Clarendon Press, London, 1964.
- Hegel's Science of Logic*. Translated by A.V. Miller with a Foreword by J.N. Findlay, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1969.
- Philosophy of History*. Preface by Charles Hegel. Translated from German by J. Sibnes, New Introduction by C.J. Fredrich, Dover Publications, New York, 1956.

- Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830). Translated by William Wallace together with the *Zusätze in Boumann's Text* (1845). Translated by A.V. Miller with a Foreword by J.N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, London, 1971.
- Philosophy of Right*. Translated from German by T.M. Knox. Oxford University Press, London, 1952.
- Three Essays, 1793-1795*. Edited and Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Peter Fuss and John Dobbins, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1984.
- Hospers, John. *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*. Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1986.
- Inwood, Michael (Ed.). *Hegel: Oxford Readings in Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985.
- Kainz, Howard P. *Hegel's Phenomenology Part I: Analysis and Commentary*, University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1976.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1963.
- Marx, Werner. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Commentary Based on the Preface and Introduction*. Translated by Peter Heath, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1988.
- Mure, G.R.G. *An Introduction to Hegel*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970.
- Narain, Harsh. *Evolution of Dialectic*. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas, 1973.
- Nurse, G.R. *The Philosophy of Hegel*. Oxford University Press. London, New York, Toronto, 1965.
- Patrick, G.T.W. *Introduction to Philosophy*. Surjeet Publications, Kamla Nagar, Delhi, 1978.
- Sachdeva and Gupta. *A Simple Study of Political Thought: Ancient and Modern*. Ajanta Prakashan, Delhi, 1994.
- Sarlenijin, Andrias. *Hegel's Dialectic*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Holland, 1975.

- Singer, Peter. *Hegel*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.
- Solomon, Robert C. *From Hegel to Existentialism*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
- Stace, W.T. *The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition*. Dover Publications Inc., USA, 1955.
- Stainkrais, W.E. *New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., New York, 1971.
- Taylor, Charles. *Hegel*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
- Thilly, Frank. *A History of Philosophy*. Central Book Depot, Allahabad, 1981.
- Thompson, John Edward. *Hegelism: The Path Towards Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980.
- Varma, V.P. *Political Philosophy*. Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, Agra, 1986.
- Wilkings, Burleigh Taylor. *Hegel's Philosophy of History*. Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1974.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976.

Articles

- Allen, Robal Van Roden, "Hegelian Beginning and Resolve: A View of the Relationship Between the Phenomenology and the Logic". *Idealistic Studies*. Vol. 13. Clark University, Worcester, 1983, pp. 249-265.
- Boubia, Fawzi. "Hegel's Internationalism: World History and Exclusion". *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 28, No. 4. The Metaphilosophy Foundation and Blackwell Publishers Ltd., USA, 1997, pp. 417-431.
- Butler, Clark. "Hermeneutic Hegelianism", *Idealistic Studies*, Vol. 15, Clark University, Worcester, 1985, pp. 121-135.
- Dehlstrom, Daniel O. "Hegel's Science of Logic and Idea of Truth", *Idealistic Studies*, Vol. 13, 1983, pp. 33-49.
- Elder, Crawford L. "Hegel and the Explanation of Behaviour",

- Idealistic Studies*, Clark University, Worcester, Vol. 10, 1980, pp. 157-171.
- Elder, Crawford L. "Hegel's Reason for Using the Concept of an Absolute", *Idealistic Studies*, Vol. 13, Clark University, 1983, pp. 50-60.
- Houlgate, Stephen. "Schelling's Critique of Hegel's Science of Logic", *The Review of Metaphysics a Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. LIII, No. 1, Issue No. 209 (Ed.). Jude P. New York, 1999, pp. 99-128.
- Lumsden, Simon. "A Subject of Hegel's Logic", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, New York, 2000, Vol. XL, No. 1, pp. 85-99.
- Miklowitz, Paul S. "The Ontological Status of Style in Hegel's Phenomenology", *Idealistic Studies*, Vol. 13, Clark University, Worcester, 1983, pp. 61-73.
- Singh, R.P. "From Dialogue to Dialectic: Socrates, Kant, Hegel and Marx", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, 2000, University of Poona, pp. 259-274.
- Singh, R.P. "Spontaneity and Spirit: Hegel on Kant's Impasse of Freedom", *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, New Delhi, 1995, Vol. XII, No. 2, pp. 13-26.
- Stormer, Gerald D. "Hegel and the Secret of James Hutchinson Stirling", *Idealistic Studies*, Vol. 9, 1979, Clark University, Worcester, pp. 33-53.
- Webb, C.W. "Hegel's Reasoning", *Idealistic Studies*, Clark University, Vol. 9, 1978, Worcester, pp. 206-219.
- Williams, Howard L. "Feuerbach and Hegel", *Idealistic Studies*, Clark University, Worcester, Vol. 9, 1978, pp. 136-155.

Index

- Absolute Experience, 13
 Absolute Idea, 25, 37–38, 41, 50,
 71–72, 75, 124
 Absolute negativity, 127
 Absolute prius, 79
 Absolute Spirit, 14, 25, 92, 102,
 121
 Absolutist, 13, 71
 Abstract coalescence, 86
 Abstract concepts, 116
 Abstract development, 103
 Abstract entities, 50–52
 Abstract expressions, 43
 Abstract ideals, 3
 Abstractions, 23–24, 43, 51–52,
 77, 91, 96, 130
 Abstract medium, 100, 103
 Abstract terms, 79
 Acquaintance knowledge, 129
 Actualization, 81
 Advait Vedant, 116, 122
 Aesthetics, 6, 120
 Alien causality, 69
 Amphibolies, 10
 Analysis of Hegel, 63, 66, 131
 Analytic method, 93
 Analytic philosophy, 11, 96
 Anglo-American world, 128
 Anglo-Saxon world, 11
 Animal organism, 79, 81, 84–85
 Anti-Hegelians, 130
 Anti-metaphysical philosophers,
 124
 Antinomies, 10, 95, 97–98
 Antinomies of Pure Reason, 95
 Antithetical approaches, 5
 Anxious focus, 12
 Aristotelianism, 67
 Aristotelian physics, 67
 Aristotelian range, 2
 Aristotelian teleology, 74
 Aristotle, 14, 38, 58, 67–69, 74–
 75, 87, 117–19, 125, 127–28
 Aristotle's Intelligence, 117
 Aristotle's metaphysics, 67
 Arithmetical operations, 132
 Asiatic and African religions, 122
 Atman, 116, 122
 Authentic nature, 101
 Bergson, Henry, 82
 Biblical theory of creation, 77
 Binding principle, 110
 Biological induction, 69
 Bismarkian age, 11
 Blackwell, Basil, 18
 Boundless blessedness, 115
 Bradley, 11, 13, 31, 35–36, 71,
 130
 Brahman, 116, 122
 Brahman of Samkara, 115–16
 Brahminical traditions, 85
 British empiricists, 35, 45
 British realism, 96
 Buddhist Svalaxsna (pure
 sensation), 55
 Cartesianism, 67
 Cartesian theory, 49
 Cartesian theory of body, 49

- Centrifugal forces, 82
- Christianity, 3, 63–64, 122, 127
- Classical senses, 7
- Collateral conditions, 31
- Collateral histories, 48
- Complementarity, 96
- Conceptual analysis, 1, 123, 128
- Conceptual blue-prints, 13
- Conceptualization, 56–57, 76
- Conflict resolution, 118
- Consciousness, 10, 14, 19, 25, 35, 40, 48–49, 51, 54, 64, 98, 100, 116, 122
 - human, 51, 111, 125
 - individual, 125
 - ordinary, 10
 - sceptical, 102
 - supramundane, 13
 - universal, 50, 110
- Constitutional monarchy, 63
- Contemporary idioms, 1, 104, 128
- Contemporary period, 127–28
- Contemporary philosophy, 16
- Contemporary treaties, 68
- Contingency, 71
- Contradiction Reason, 98
- Contradictions, 10, 15, 60, 82, 92, 94–99, 101, 104–7, 111, 113, 119, 130
 - absolute, 113
 - endure, 98
- Cosmology, 7, 83
- Critical assessment, 1
- Critique of Pure Reason, 7, 53
- Crystallization, 83
- Culmination, 1

- Deductive method, 92–93
- Descartes, 53
- Dialectic, 17, 19, 89, 95–103, 105, 107, 127, 131
 - entitled Logic of, 17, 131
 - triplicity of, 99
- Dialectical method, 10, 16, 89–90, 92, 94
- Direct expressions, 84
- Direct Intuitive Acquaintance, 55

- Disastrous dualism, 9
- Duchy of Wurttemberg, 2

- Ego, 52–53, 60, 84
 - pure, 61
 - transcendental, 53–54
- Emanationism, 79
- Empirical psychology, 51–52, 54, 56–57, 59
- Empirical verification, 125
- Empiricist philosophers, 59, 96
- Epistemological analysis, 129
- European Philosophy, 1, 89, 109, 112, 119
- Existentialism, 5, 11, 18
- Experience of consciousness, 10
- Explicit forms, 114, 119–21
- Exteriorization, 72
- Extraordinary fusion, 58

- Falsification, 125
- Fascism, 16
- Free Spirit, 55

- Galileo, 128
- Germanic idealism, 1
- God
 - abstract, 130
 - actual, 120
 - of religion, 122
 - temples of, 77, 130
- Graeco-Roman Goddess of wisdom, 132
- Grammar, 106
- Gravitation, 48, 82, 86
- Greek literature, 30
- Greek Philosophers, 87
- Gymnasium, 2

- Hegel, 1–7, 9–25, 27–28, 36–39, 41–45, 47, 49–64, 66–68, 70–87, 89–107, 109–33
 - approach values, 6
 - characterized, 127
 - death, 86
 - delineate, 118
 - discussed, 122
 - interpreted, 16

- mathematics, 95
- transformed, 11
- Hegelian
 - absolute idea, 71
 - concept of contradiction, 104
 - concept of history, 11
 - concept of nature, 74
 - philosophy, 19
 - philosophy, 25, 53, 68, 80, 93, 104, 127, 132
 - spirit, 107, 111–12
 - thought, 67, 127
- Hegelianism, 1, 5, 11, 70–71, 80
- Heidelberg Science of Logic, 4
- Historical antecedents, 5–6
- Hitler, 16
- Hitlerism, 12
- Hitler's Fascism, 16
- Hylton, Peter, 11, 129–30

- Idealized portraits, 2
- Ideational theory, 35
- Intellectual disciplines, 123
- Intellectual intuition, 9–10
- Interpretative disciplines, 128
- Intrusive elements, 119
- Inwood, Michael, 129

- Jewish-Christian tradition, 74

- Kant's Transcendental Ego, 52–53, 111
- Knowledge
 - absolute, 10, 52
 - empirical, 55, 129
 - factual, 103
 - human, 53
 - objects of, 90, 113
 - perfect, 76
 - rational, 7

- Language game, 57, 95, 112, 129
- Linguistic expressions, 35
- Logic of Dialectic, 89

- Magical forms, 122
- Materialistic concepts, 74
- Mechanical conjunction, 95

- Mechanistic conception, 8
- Mechanistic materialism, 74
- Medieval philosophers, 30
- Medieval philosophy, 30
- Mental images, 31–32, 34
- Mental pictures, 33, 117
- Metaphysical disharmonies, 111
- Metaphysics, systematic, 96
- Meta-theorems, 93
- Multi-level discourse, 105
- Mutual attrition, 57
- Mystical experience, 124

- Napoleon, 4
- Naturphilosophie, 67–69, 130

- Objective Spirit, 44, 62, 64, 80
- Objects
 - absolute, 36
 - definite, 24
 - external, 31
 - individual, 40
 - mental, 27
 - natural, 120
 - particular, 32
 - physical, 34
 - self-subsistent, 115
 - sensory, 29
- Organism, geological, 81, 84
- Oriental philosophers, 79

- Peaceful communion, 115
- Philosophical orthodoxy, 11
- Philosophical psychology, 54, 59
- Philosophical scepticism, 97
- Philosophical standpoints, 85
- Philosophical terms, 29
- Philosophical thinking, 22–23
- Philosophical wealth, 130
- Philosophy of
 - evolution, 80
 - Logic forms, 80
 - Nature, 4, 14, 66–67, 71, 75–76, 80, 83, 100, 103
 - Religion, 4
 - Spirit, 4, 50, 54, 80, 100, 116
- Pinkard, Terry, 128–29
- Platonic ideas, 118

- Pre-Darwinian ages, 74
 Prejudiced misconceptions, 12

 Ramsiej, Dhirendro, 130
 Religious
 concepts, 52
 conflict, 111
 discourse, 15
 Rules of inference, 93
 Russell, Bertrand, 5, 11, 123,
 129–30

 Samkara, 115, 128
 Samkhya philosophers, 80
 Samkhya system of Indian
 philosophy, 119
 Science of Logic, 52, 94, 100, 115,
 132
 Scientific theory, 15, 73–74, 83
 Self-consciousness, 53–54, 100,
 110, 118, 122
 Spirit, 110
 spirit, 14, 100, 103–4
 Self-contradictory
 expressions, 104
 statement, 15
 Self-externality, 81–82
 Semantic analysis, 92
 Sensuous object, 24
 Sexual reproduction, 85–86
 Social arrangements, 62
 Solomon, Robert C., 11, 50, 110,
 128–29
 Speculative thought, 98
 Spinoza's mechanistic philosophy,
 8
 Spirit of Nations, 121
 Spiritualism, 71
 Subjective idealism of Berkeley,
 14, 75, 86
 Subjectivism, 14, 66–67
 Subjectivity, 36, 45, 56–57, 59, 78
 Subject-object identity, 10
 Super-personal mind, 110
 Suprasensible entities, 13
 Syllogism, 15, 41
 Synthesis of subject, 45

 Theodicistic philosophy, 103

 Theoretical mind, 55, 62
 Theory of
 creation, 77, 79
 evolution, 79–81
 Thought
 abstract, 24
 bare, 28
 concrete, 23–24, 28
 empty, 79
 factual, 24
 imageless, 33
 object of, 22, 36
 pictorial, 114
 produced, 125
 pure, 43, 59
 self-thinking, 117
 solidified, 22
 Timelessness eternity, 78
 Totalistic explanation, 90
 Transcendent
 idealism, 74
 metaphysician, 12
 Triadic principle, 100
 Tribal group, 131
 Truth
 absolute, 38, 126
 philosophical, 53
 Tubingen University, 2

 Ultimate ground, 75
 Ultimate reality, 116
 Unanalysed awareness, 55
 Unbounded ego-centricity, 119
 Undoubted greatness, 67
 Unified astronomy, 83
 Unity of subject, 37, 44
 Universalizing agency, 116
 Upanishadas, 117

 Verbal magic, 113
 Vitalistic materialism, 9

 Wanton obscurity of language, 12

 Wissenschaft, 15
 Wittgenstein's phraseology, 95

 Zusätze, 4



881

1318



18325

Dr. K. Dhirendro Ramsiej was born in 1958 at Sakwang Village in West Khasi Hills, Meghalaya. He had his early education in his village and then graduated from Shillong College, Shillong, and completed his M.A. in Philosophy, M. Phil. and Ph. D. from North Eastern Hill University, Shillong. He was the founder Principal of Sngap Syiem College, Mawkyrwat, West Khasi Hills, Meghalaya, and served therefrom 1985 to 1987. He then joined as Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Shillong College, Shillong, in 1987 and continued with the academic job with distinction till he joined as the Principal of the same College on 1st July, 2011, and continues to serve in the same post till date. He was also the founder Secretary of Nongpathaw Secondary School, Nongpathaw village, Meghalaya, and also Seven Huts Secondary School, Mawlai Umthong, Shillong. He has contributed many articles and also the author of the books: "A Guide to Logic", "Ka Mariang Ha U Khasi", "Ki Khubor ka Jingim", "Khasi Philosophy of Nature" etc. He is currently a member of the following institutions: John Robert Theological Seminary, Mawklot; Synod College, Shillong; Academic Council, North Eastern Hill University; The Khasi Authors' Society; The Gideons International in India; Chairman of Cluster Resource Centre; S.S.A. Mawmih Area, and Joint Forest Management, Nongpathaw Area. He also served as the President of Meghalaya College Teachers' Association from 2005 to 2010.

Other Books of Interest

DR. XAVIER PFOKREHE MAO

Virtue and Morality

SONALI BHATT MARWAHA

Colours of Truth: Religion, Self and Emotion

D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

Environment Evolution & Values

P.K. MOHAPATRA

Ethics and Society

M.M. AGRAWAL


Freedom of the Soul : A Post Modern Understanding of Hinduism

M.M. AGGARWAL

Philosophy of Self Knowledge

V. TURNER

Process Performance and Pilgrimage: A Study in Comparative Symbology



CONCEPT PUBLISHING COMPANY (P) LTD.

A/15&16, Commercial Block, Mohan Garden New Delhi-110 059

Ph. : 25351460, 25351794

Fax : +91-11-25357109

Email: publishing@conceptpub.com

Website : www.conceptpub.com

Showroom: Building No. 4788-90, Street No. 23, Ansari Road,
Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110 002

Ph. 23272187

ISBN 81-8069-955-2



₹ 450